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The "Rights" and "Wrongs" of Wrongful Birth





The advent and increasing sophistication of medical technology,
which allows the detection of birth defects in utero, has resulted in
recognition of two tort claims unknown at common law: wrongful
birth and wrongful life.1 There is an emerging trend in the state
legislatures and courts toward rejection of wrongful birth and
wrongful life causes of action.2 This article provides a critical anal-
ysis that supports the rejection of wrongful birth/wrongful life
causes of action.
A wrongful birth action is brought by parents seeking damages
for the birth of a "defective" child. The parents allege that they
would have aborted the child if the defendants, health care person-
nel, had properly advised them of the risks of birth defects. The
defendants are charged with: (1) failing to perform diagnostic tests
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1. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis: Parents' Right to a "Per-
fect" Child?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 571 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Liability for Negligent
Prenatal Diagnosis]; Comment, Wrongful Life: The Tort That Nobody Wants, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 847, 849 (1983); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 239, 513 A.2d 341, 345 (1986).
2. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8305 (1988); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (1986); MINN.
STAT. § 145.424 subd. 2 (1984); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Spencer v.
Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635
(1986); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Schork v.
Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
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which could have revealed the child's disabilities before birth; (2)
negligently performing diagnostic tests; or (3) failing to accurately
advise the parents of test results. The parents claim this negligence
deprived them of the opportunity to abort the defective fetus.
They seek recovery for their emotional distress and for the excep-
tional medical and educational expenses of rearing the child.
As of September, 1988, courts of appeal in seventeen (17) states
have accepted the wrongful birth claim.4 Federal courts in three
(3) states have accepted the claim based upon their interpretation
of state law.5 Appellate courts in four (4) states have rejected the
wrongful birth claim.6 One state supreme court (Minnesota) has
upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the wrongful
birth claim.
7
The wrongful life action is distinct from the wrongful birth ac-
tion in that a wrongful life claim is brought by or on behalf of a
child with disabilities. The alleged negligepce is the same-the
failure to test, detect, or warn of fetal defects. The child claims
that its very existence is a legal wrong, and that, but for the negli-
gence of the defendant doctor or health care provider, the plaintiff/
child would have been aborted. The child claims damages for pain
and suffering during his life, and for the exceptional expenses asso-
ciated with medical care and education during his life time.8
As of September, 1988, state courts of appeal in five (5) states
have accepted the wrongful life claim,9 whereas it has been rejected
3. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 477, 656 P.2d 483, 494 (1983).
4. Andalon v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 600, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984);
Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987); Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla.
1984); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984) (overturned by statute); Goldberg
v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984), aff'd, 113 Ill. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406
(1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(2)(1985); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App.
357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); Naccash v. Burger,
223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656
P.2d 483 (1983); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Rieck v. Medical Pro-
tective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
5. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson
Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309
(D.S.C. 1983).
6. Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (in dictum); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751
S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987).
7. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
8. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
9. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d. 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Conti-
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by courts of appeal in sixteen (16) states.10 One federal court has
rejected wrongful life actions." One (1) state supreme court (Min-
nesota) has upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting
wrongful life claims.
12
While the wrongful life claim has been frequently rejected, the
wrongful birth action is gaining acceptance." s Both actions are sim-
ilar in two respects. First, an essential element in each action is the
contention that the parents would have aborted their child if in-
formed of fetal defects. This introduces into any bioethical evalua-
tion of these actions the ethical issues surrounding abortion. 4 Sec-
ond, both claims rely on a fundamental jurisprudential position
that a life itself, if defective, can be a legal wrong, a "damage" to
the parents of that life and the child who lives it.'5 The alternative
nental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Siemieniec
v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 134 Ill. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227 (1985); Procanik v. Cillo, 97
N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483
(1983).
See also Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988). The Louisiana Su-
preme Court has recognized, in dicta, a very limited form of wrongful life action: "Logic and
sound policy require a recognition of a legal duty to a child not yet conceived but
foreseeably harmed by the negligent delivery of health care services to the child's parents."
Id. at 1157 (emphasis added). In Pitre, a child with a disability (albinism) was born follow-
ing a negligently performed tubal ligation. The court held that albinism was not a foresee-
able harm for which the physician should be held liable.
10. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Goldberg v. Ruskin,
113 Ill. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635
(1986); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (in dictum); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106
Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988);
Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d 341 (1986); Alequijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp.
Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1984); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315
N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Spencer v. Seikel, 742
P.2d 1126 (Okla. 1987); Ellis v. Sherman, 512 Pa. 14, 515 A.2d 1327 (1986); Nelson v.
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
11. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980).
12. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
13. 7 CAUSES OF ACTION 589, Cause of Action for Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Life § 4
(1985) [hereinafter CAUSES OF ACTION].
14. See generally Reich, Life: Quality of Life, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcS 829
(W. Reich ed. 1978). Reich notes that arguments for abortion based on a benefit to the
unborn child, as in the wrongful life context, raise "the problem of whether an individual
can really be the beneficiary of an action that terminates its very existence." Id. at 837
(citing Camenisch, Abortion: For the Fetus's Own Sake?, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 38, 39
(Apr. 1976)).
15. Id. Reich notes that the premise of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions, that a
life can be a "wrong," "raises several objections: how and under what conditions existence
itself can be an injury, and the impossibility of measuring damages equitably against intan-
gible benefits associated with life." Id. at 837 (citing Comment, Wrongful Birth: The
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to this "wrong" is the termination of the developing life through
abortion. This characteristic of these tort claims introduces into a
bioethical evaluation the issues of "value of life""6 and "quality of
life."' 7
Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims must be distinguished
from two other claims: wrongful conception and wrongful preg-
nancy. Both of these claims have been accepted under traditional
common law personal injury analysis. Generally, wrongful concep-
tion is a claim brought by parents against the physician for the
pregnancy and birth of a nondisabled child following a negligently
performed sterilization or contraception procedure. As of Septem-
ber, 1988, courts of appeal in thirty (30) states and the District of
Columbia have accepted the wrongful conception claim,' 8 and one
(1) federal court has accepted the claim.' 9 One (1) state court has
rejected the claim. 0 Of those that recognize the claim, courts in
seven (7) states have allowed damages for the ordinary expenses of
Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 140-159 (1976)).
16. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 181, 343 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1986); see also Brug-
geman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 248, 718 P.2d 635, 638 (1986).
17. See generally Singer, Life: Value of Life, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 822 (W.
Reich ed. 1978).
18. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); University of Ariz. v. Superior
Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568
(1982); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli,
187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C.
1984); Ramey v. Fassoulas, 414 So. 2d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp.
Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d
193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983); Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Byrd v.
Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d
861 (Ky. 1983); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Macomber v.
Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986); Sad v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Clev-
enger v. Haling, 379 Mass. 154, 394 N.E.2d 1119 (1979); Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App.
47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977);
Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Szekeres v. Robinson, 102 Nev. 93,
715 P.2d 1076 (1986); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); P. v.
Portadin, 179 N.J. Super. 465, 432 A.2d 556 (1981); O'Toole v. Greenberg, 64 N.Y.2d 427,
477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1983); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 347 S.E.2d
743 (1986); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Goforth v. Porter
Medical Assocs., Inc., 755 P.2d 678 (Okla. 1988); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484,
453 A.2d 974 (1982); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987); McKernan v. Aasheim,
102 Wash. 2d 411, 687 P.2d 850 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
19. Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852
F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988), although characterized as a wrongful conception action by the
court, is not included here because it is not a wrongful conception action as herein defined.
20. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975).
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rearing and educating the child.21 The wrongful conception claim
has been recognized under the following titles: medical malpractice
(negligence), wrongful conception, wrongful pregnancy, wrongful
birth, breach of contract, trespass and assumpsit.
Wrongful pregnancy is a claim brought by the parents against a
physician for the pregnancy and birth of a nondisabled child fol-
lowing a negligently performed abortion procedure. As of Septem-
ber, 1988, courts of appeal in five (5) states have accepted the
wrongful pregnancy action.22 No state or federal court has rejected
the action. No state or federal court has allowed damages for child
rearing or education. This cause of action has been recognized
under the following titles: wrongful pregnancy, malpractice, wrong-
ful birth, trespass and assumpsit.
Wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy are distinct from
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims because the pregnancy and
delivery are asserted to be the wrong, not the resulting life. Dam-
ages are usually limited to the pain and suffering of pregnancy and
delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium. 3 Damages for child
rearing and education are usually not allowed on the theory that a
healthy human life is not a legal wrong or injury to the parents.2"
By contrast, where wrongful birth and wrongful life claims are rec-
ognized, damages for the exceptional costs of rearing and educat-
ing a child with disabilities are always allowed. In wrongful concep-
tion and wrongful pregnancy cases, the ethical and philosophical
problems in preferring non-existence to existence, implicit in
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, are thus avoided. More-
over, since the abortion choice is not involved, abortion issues are
21. University of Ariz. v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983); Custodio
v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445
A.2d 883 (1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (Ct. Spec. App. 1984);
Clapham v. Yanga, 102 Mich. App. 47, 300 N.W.2d 727 (1980); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
22. Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Morse v. Soffer, 101 A.D.2d 856, 476 N.Y.S.2d 170 ( N.Y.
App. Div. 1984); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Miller v. Johnson, 231
Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986).
23. E.g., Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 183, 183-84, 343 S.E.2d 301, 305 (1986) (allowing
recovery for medical expenses, pain and suffering, lost wages, and emotional distress directly
resulting from the negligently performed abortion, the continuing pregnancy, and the ensu-
ing birth); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 723 (Ala. 1982) (compensation for medical ex-
penses, pain and suffering, and mental anguish as a result of pregnancy, as well as for the
loss to husband of the comfort, companionship, services, and consortium of the wife during
her pregnancy and immediately after birth).
24. See cases cited in Miller, 231 Va. at 183-86, 343 S.E.2d at 305-06.
1989 465
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not raised by the wrongful conception/pregnancy claim.2 5
Wrongful conception and pregnancy actions are distinct in an-
other aspect. Such claims involve the birth of a normal but un-
wanted child. The typical wrongful birth/life action involves par-
ents who initially desire a child, but do not produce a child
meeting the desired "quality" standards. 26 Thus, a distinction be-
tween the value of a nondisabled child and a child with disabilities
is inherent in wrongful birth/life. No cause of action arises if, in
spite of a doctor's negligence, a nondisabled child is born. It is only
when a child with disabilities is born that the birth or life is
"wrongful." This "quality of life" distinction is usually not impli-
cated in the wrongful conception and pregnancy claims.
In essence, wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy fall
within traditional common law torts relating to medical malprac-
tice or negligence. They require no new legal theories. However,
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims do require a new legal the-
ory, because life itself is considered a wrong, and death is preferred
over life with disabilities. By deviating from the general principle
in the law that life, even with disabilities, is valuable and that only
wrongful death is compensable, wrongful birth/life actions are a
radical departure from existing law.
I. THERE IS No CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR WRONGFUL BIRTH
AND WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSES OF ACTION
Prior to the 1973 decision by the United States Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade,2 7 wrongful birth/life and wrongful pregnancy ac-
25. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 724 (Faulkner, J., concurring specially) ("The resolution of
the question of a physician's liability for wrongful pregnancy ... does not require 'intrusion
into the domain of moral philosophy.' . . . [T]he purpose of an action for wrongful preg-
nancy [conception] is not to recover for the life of the child."). In wrongful pregnancy ac-
tions, the issue is not failure to inform of an abortion choice, but medical malpractice for
negligence in the abortion procedure under traditional tort principles. Miller, 231 Va. at
182, 343 S.E.2d at 304.
26. See Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 570.
Unlike the parents in the wrongful conception/pregnancy cases involving a "healthy but
unwanted" child, the parents in wrongful birth cases:
did not engage the defendant's services for the purpose of preventing reproduction,
but for furthering the normal process of pregnancy. . . . [T]hey were ready and will-
ing to assume the financial burdens normally associated with raising a child. ...
[T]he gravamen of the complaint is that they were denied the opportunity to avoid
the birth of this specific child with its specific 'defect.'
Id. See also Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 638 n.91
(1979) [hereinafter Capron].
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
466 Vol. 27:461
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tions were generally unsuccessful, one reason being the then-pre-
vailing public policy against abortion.28 With the Roe Court's
enunciation of a woman's privacy right which protected the abor-
tion decision from state criminal prosecution, wrongful birth
claims were recognized by some courts on the theory that the neg-
ligence of the health care provider had infringed on this private,
protected choice. 29 Commentators are nearly unanimous in con-
cluding that Roe v. Wade provided the legal springboard for the
wave of wrongful birth actions that subsequently appeared.30 This
conclusion is supported by the language and citations to Roe found
in the decisions which recognized the new cause of action.3"
For example, one such opinion in Berman v. Allan 2 noted that
"[tihe Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade . ..clearly estab-
lishes that a woman possesses a constitutional right to decide
whether her fetus should be aborted. . . . Public policy now sup-
ports, rather than militates against, the proposition that she not be
28. Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1970), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d 804, 264 N.E.2d 354, 315 N.Y.S.2d 863, affd, 30
N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (wrongful birth Aife); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 41, 227 A.2d 689, 699 (1967) (Francis, J., concurring)(wrongful birth /
life); Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) (wrongful pregnancy);
Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957) (wrongful pregnancy).
29. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 85, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (1981) (per curiam) (Flaherty,
J.) ("[Rieliance on the Commonwealth's public policy favoring birth over abortion ... can-
not succeed because it squarely conflicts with the plaintiff's constitutional right as articu-
lated in Roe v. Wade."); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430-31, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847-48 (Tex. 1975) ("[A]ll of the penal code provisions relative
to abortion were declared to be in violation of the United States Constitution in Roe v.
Wade.. . . So long as no violation of criminal statutes is proposed, the courts should regard
the [abortion] question as one to be resolved by the wife and her husband."); Gildiner v.
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania law);
Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 236, 513 A.2d 341, 346 (1986); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), rev'd in part sub nom., Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)("[I]nherent in the abolition of the
statutory ban on abortion ... is a public policy consideration which gives potential parents
the right within certain statutory and case law limitations, not to have a child." (emphasis
added)).
30. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 26, at 635 n.67; 7 CAUSES OF ACTION, supra note 13, at
6; Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 693
(1983-84); Note, Wrongful Birth: Who Owes What to Whom and Why? 40 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 123, 124 (1983); Note, Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.: A Major Step Forward in the
Evolution of Wrongful Life, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 203 (1984) [hereinafter Note, A Major Step
Forward in the Evolution of Wrongful Life]; Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of
Tort Liability For Injury To The Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and
Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1453, 1454.
31. See supra note 29.
32. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
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impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that deci-
sion.""e The opinion alludes to a "constitutional right to abort fe-
tuses" and "Mrs. Berman's loss of her right to abort the fetus."34
This article demonstrates that the "rights" and "interests" bal-
anced in Roe, even if accepted for the sake of argument, do not
rationally support wrongful birth/life causes of action.
A. Roe v. Wade Did Not Create a Right to Recover in
Wrongful Birth/Life Actions
In order to facilitate a jurisprudential analysis of the "rights"
established in Roe v. Wade, it is necessary to define several signifi-
cantly distinct legal relationships. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, in
his monumental work Fundamental Legal Conceptions,35 provides
a helpful analysis of legal relationships. Hohfeld discerned that
what is often indiscriminately deemed a "right" may be, in a given
case, any one of four significantly distinct legal relationships: a
claim for damages, a privilege, a power, or an immmunity.3 a
Hohfeld saw right in its proper sense as the first of these four, an
affirmative legal claim against another, as in "the right of the
plaintiffs" to bring suit.3 7 A "right" in the sense of the second cate-
gory, a privilege, is the negation of a legal duty, as a "privilege
against self-incrimination" in the face of a duty to testify fully and
truthfully.38 A "right" falls into the category of a power when it is
a legal ability, as, for example, when the holder of a property right
of alienability has the legal power to transfer his interest.3 The
right as an immunity is an exemption, a freedom from legal
liability.
40
In delineating the nature of these types of rights, Hohfeld de-
scribed an opposite and a jural correlative for each. 1 The opposite
33. Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14.
34. Id. at 432-33, 404 A.2d at 14.
35. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919) [hereinafter HOHFELD].
36. Id. at 36.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Id. at 46.
39. Id. at 50-51.
40. Id. at 60-62. In sum, "a right is one's affirmative claim against another, and a
privilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of another ...whereas an immunity is
one's freedom from the legal power of 'control' of another as regards some legal relation."
Id. at 60.
41. "The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, sui generis; and thus ...
attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory. . .. Accordingly, the most promis-
ing line of procedure seems to consist in exhibiting all of the various relations in a scheme of
'opposites' and 'correlatives'." Id. at 36. The jural opposites are as follows: right/no-right;
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of the right as legal claim is what Hohfeld deemed the "no-right.""'
The corresponding legal relation, or jural correlative, of the right
as an affirmative claim is a duty." For example, a landowner has
an affirmative claim against a trespasser for violating a duty not to
enter." The opposite of a privilege is a duty.'5 For example, the
duty to testify may be negated by a privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. 4' The correlative of a privilege is "no-right.' 47 Where a
trespasser may be privileged to enter land, as of necessity, the
landowner has "no-right" to a claim for trespass.
48
The opposite of power, or legal ability, is, obviously, legal disa-
bility,49 and the correlative relation to power is legal liability. 50 The
opposite of immunity is legal liability, as when a landowner with a
tax exemption is immune from taxation, but without such immu-
nity is legally liable for taxes.5 1 The jural correlative to an immu-
privilege/duty; power/disability; immunity/liability. The jural correlatives are as follows:
right/duty; privilege/no-right; power/liability; immunity/disability. Id. at 36.
42. Hohfeld invented the term "no-right." For example, if party A breaches a contract,
B has an affirmative claim, a "right" to compensation. If A never contracted with B, B has
"no-right" to damages. A landowner has an affirmative claim against a trespasser, but where
no such claim lies, as when a sheriff is privileged to enter, the landowner has "no-right." Id.
at 38-39.
43. The "invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a
right or claim" is a duty. Id. at 39. Where A has a right against B, B has a correlative duty
not to violate that right. Where a duty is violated, a right is invaded, just as any injured
party has a legal claim against the tortfeasor that caused the injury by breaching the correl-
ative duty. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 36.
46. Id. A landowner, by virtue of his property "right," has the privilege of entering his
own land, a negation of the duty to stay off would apply to a non-owner. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 36.
48. Or, for example, where the sheriff has the privilege to enter the land under a writ
of execution, the landowner has no legal right ("no-right") to sue for trespass. If party A has
not contracted to work for B, A's privilege of not performing negates any duty to do so.
Thus, correlative to A's privilege not to perform is a "no-right" on B's part to claim dam-
ages for nonperformance. Id. at 39.
49. If a sheriff has the power to sell property under a writ of execution, the property
owner is subject to a legal disability which cuts off his power, or right, to freely alienate his
land. Id. at 53.
50. For example, when A has power to accept B's contract offer, there is a correspond-
ing liability on the part of B to be bound by the contract if accepted. Id. at 55. When a
property owner has a power to alienate his property, the correlative liability to the exercise
of that power is the loss of his other property rights. Id. at 58. If the sheriff has the power to
dispose of the land by tax sale, the landowner is not only under a legal disability to prevent
the sale (the opposite of the sheriff's power), but the landowner is also subject to losing his
land should the sheriff exercise his power-a liability correlative to the sheriff's power. Id.
at 60.
51. Id. at 60-61.
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nity is a legal disability. s2 If a landowner is exempt, or immune,
from taxation, the state is under a corresponding legal disability
which prevents it from taxing that landowner.
Hohfeld's analysis provides a framework by which the "right"
recognized in Roe v. Wade may be compared to the "right" essen-
tial to a wrongful birth action."' The wrongful birth claim repre-
sents a right in the strict Hohfeldian meaning of "right"-a legal
claim against another for breach of a legal duty. The typical
wrongful birth claim applies basic negligence theory. Such a claim
alleges a legal duty (Hohfeld's jural correlative) to use reasonable
care in genetic screening, testing, or counseling, and a breach of
that duty by the defendant, resulting in an affirmative claim, or
right to recover, for the resultant damages.54 In contrast, the
"right" of privacy discussed in Roe v. Wade, historically and
within the operative facts of the case, is a right to be free from
state prosecution in "personal" areas such as abortion, or "marital
intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage,
or procreation, or education. '55 Thus, the "right" is, in Hohfeldian
52. Id. at 36, 60. "X, a landowner, has ...power to alienate to Y or to any other
ordinary party. . . . Y is under a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as shifting the legal
interest either to himself or to a third party." Id. at 60.
53. Hohfeld's delineation of fundamental legal relations is not without application in
other areas of modern jurisprudence. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act 1, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(B) (1977) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . .contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity." (emphasis added)); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-125 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (frequent mention of "Hohfeldian plaintiffs" and "non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs" in
discussion of standing); see also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 483-
94 (1965); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States").
Hohfeld's analysis is particularly helpful in the present context, i.e., in determining when
a generic "right" gives rise to a cause of action or legal claim. See, e.g., D. LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES 1079-84 (1985). Laycock discusses implied causes of action for constitu-
tional violations and notes that a substantive right, whether granted by the constitution or
statute, is distinct from a right of action for a private remedy. To gain a private remedy, one
must clear several hurdles. One must have the "right" in strict Hohfeldian terms, that is, a
claim or cause of action. One must also have a substantive right, which, in Hohfeldian
terms, grants one freedom from another's claims or rights, a privilege. One must have the
"right" or Hohfeldian "power" to invoke a court's jurisdiction. Finally, if one seeks his rem-
edy against the government, the government must waive its immunity, in Hohfeldian terms,
its right to be free from legal liability. Even where Congress or the constitution have oper-
ated to create a substantive right, a grant of jurisdiction, and a waiver of immunity, a cause
of action may not have been created. Id. at 1083 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
392 (1976)).
54. 7 CAUSES OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 3.
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
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terms, a "freedom from the legal power or 'control'" of the state"
- an immunity.
The jural correlative of this immunity enjoyed by citizens is a
legal disability on the part of the state to interfere in the protected
areas. The jural opposite of the immunity is legal liability for the
same acts-if the pregnant plaintiff in Roe v. Wade had obtained
an abortion in Texas without the immunity granted by the Court,
she would have been liable to state prosecution.
Roe did not recognize a right to abort in the sense of an affirma-
tive claim for abortion services with a correlative duty on the part
of health care providers to provide those services. Nor did Roe cre-
ate a right to abort in the sense of a legal power, with a corre-
sponding legal liability, which would require others to participate
in, or facilitate, the abortion choice.5 7 As interpreted by the Court,
Roe does not require the state to provide abortion services or fund-
ing,58 or remove non-state created obstacles to the abortion
choice. 9 Nor does Roe require doctors or hospitals to provide elec-
tive, non-therapeutic abortions. Roe merely extended the "right"
of personal privacy-the constitutional protections or immunities
from state interference in private matters-to include the abortion
56. HOHFELD, supra note 35, at 60.
57. See 410 U.S. at 154.
[Ilt is not clear to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited
right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of
privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to rec-
ognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1977) (state not constitutionally required to
fund non-therapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (state not re-
quired to fund medically necessary abortion); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (1980)
(state could not be required to pay monies to secure abortions for those too poor to afford
them privately); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1977) (Roe v. Wade acknowledged an
important and valid state interest in encouraging childbirth which cannot be undercut by
requiring states to fund non-therapeutic abortions).
59. 448 U.S. at 316; 432 U.S. at 481 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The Court's holdings in
Roe v. Wade. . . and Doe v. Bolton. . . simply require that a State not create an absolute
barrier to a woman's decision to have an abortion. These precedents do not suggest that the
State is constitutionally required to assist her in procuring it.").
60. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973) (notes with approval state statute
under which "the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion .... Further, a
physician or other employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious reasons, from
participating in the abortion procedure."); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (public
hospitals are not required to provide non-therapeutic abortions); Doe v. Bellin Memorial
Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 757 (7th Cir. 1973) (fourteenth amendment protects right of privacy
from state deprivation but does not require private hospitals to open facilities for
abortions).
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decision within the parameters defined by the trimester formula."'
Roe v. Wade may have also conferred a "right" in the sense of a
privilege, that is, a negation of a legal duty, if it is accepted that,
before the decision, a pregnant woman was under a legal duty, im-
posed by the anti-abortion statutes, to give live birth. Accordingly,
the granting of this privilege from prosecution created a correlative
"no-right" on the part of the state to enforce its anti-abortion law,
at least to the extent of the trimester analysis of Roe.
The factual requirements which trigger the constitutional pro-
tections recognized in Roe demonstrate that the "immunity" in-
volved falls short of creating an affirmative claim against private
individuals who may affect the abortion choice. The Roe protec-
tions apply to state interference with the abortion decision. As the
Supreme Court explained in Maher v. Roe,62 Roe v. Wade recog-
nized only a "constitutionally protected interest 'in making certain
kinds of important decisions free from governmental compul-
sions.' "63 Even given state action, there is a constitutional viola-
tion only when the state affirmatively places "obstacles" in the way
of a "pregnant woman's path to an abortion [which were] not al-
ready there."' 4 Roe does not compel a state to remove obstacles to
the abortion choice which are not created by the state.6 5 The Court
also held in Maher that states are free to make value judgments
preferring live births over abortions and to advance those policies
through spending programs. 6
By this analysis, state courts are free to reject wrongful birth
claims without running afoul of the Roe v. Wade constitutional
guarantees. Thus, by rejecting wrongful birth claims, (1) there is
no state action which (2) affirmatively creates an obstacle to abor-
tion that did not already exist, and (3) the state may be freely ex-
-ercising a value judgment that live births are preferred.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has applied this analysis to
hold that Roe v. Wade does not constitutionally require recogni-
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-59 (1973).
62. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
63. Id. at 473 (emphasis added) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 and
nn.24 & 26 (1977)).
64. Id. at 474.
65. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980). In Harris, the Hyde Amendment's re-
striction on the use of federal funds for "medically necessary abortions" was challenged.
Explaining Maher and reiterating its holding, the Court noted that "although government
may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need
not remove those not of its own creation." Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
66. 432 U.S. at 474.
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tion of wrongful birth claims. In Hickman v. Group Health Plan,7
the Minnesota court determined the constitutionality of a state
statute which prohibited wrongful birth actions. The plaintiffs, ini-
tially bringing a wrongful birth action, alleged the statutory bar to
their claim was unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade. First, the
Minnesota court noted:
Prerequisite to a possible violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is state
action or involvement. How can it be argued that state action is involved in
this case? The relationship here is strictly between doctor and patient ...
It does not directly touch on the expectant mother's right to choose an
abortion. Due process does not require that the state adopt regulations
prohibiting purely private conduct. 8
This reasoning was clarified in a concurring opinion: "[I]f the doc-
tor's inadvertence or carelessness places an obstacle in the path of
plaintiff's abortion decisionmaking, it is placed there by the doctor,
not the state. The doctor, not the state, is precluding the patient
from making an informed abortion decision.""
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, even were
there sufficient state action, "in order to be in violation of Roe v.
Wade, the state must directly affect or impose a significant burden
on a woman's right to an abortion. '' 70 The statutory refusal to rec-
ognize wrongful birth suits did not "directly interfere with the wo-
man's right to choose a safe abortion. The two parties, doctor and
patient, are still left free to make whatever decision they feel is
appropriate.
71
Therefore, after critical legal analysis of the Roe v. Wade deci-
sion, it can be seen that the Minnesota decision is in step with the
rights recognized in Roe. Roe v. Wade did not create a right to
recover in wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action. The
state legislatures and courts, therefore, are free to refuse recogni-
tion of such claims.
Courts that have recognized wrongful birth/life actions have typ-
ically cited Roe v. Wade as the basis for this right of recovery.
However, a Hohfeldian analysis demonstrates that the two "rights"
involved are distinctly different types of legal relationships, such
that the policy justifications and interest balancing of Roe do not
compel the leap to the right to recover for wrongful birth. More-
67. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (citing Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 6 (1948)).
68. Id. at 13 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
69. Id. at 17 (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. at 14.
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over, the holding of Roe is sharply limited by its context-a con-
sideration of a state criminal statute.
B. Roe v. Wade is Based upon an Interests Analysis Quite
Distinct from the Interests to be Weighed in
Wrongful Birth/Life Actions
In order to facilitate a jurisprudential analysis of the interests
weighed in Roe v. Wade, as opposed to the interests to be weighed
in wrongful birth/life causes of action, a consideration of the basic
principles of the utilitarian theory of justice will be helpful. The
utilitarian theory of justice, as commonly understood, seeks the
greatest good for the greatest number.72 This basic formula over-
simplifies the various nuances of philosophical thought encom-
passed within the "utilitarian" rubric. For example, where utilitari-
anism is a metaethical view that determines the meanings of moral
words such as "right" or "wrong," then utilitarianism may be a
type of Ethical Naturalism. Utility is a means for describing an
act's essential rightness ("right" = utility maximizing). On the
other hand, a normative view of utilitarianism is more common, in
which utility does not fix or define rightness, but which instead
tells us what we ought to do. Whatever maximizes utility is always
"right" to do.73
Normative utilitarianism judges the morality of an act by exam-
ining its consequences. In this sense, legal philosophers with widely
divergent views regarding the meaning of moral words may all be
utilitarian.
7 4
However, at its roots, every form of utilitarianism involves a nat-
uralist or deontologic judgment as to the intrinsic value that is de-
scribed by "greatest good." "Good" may mean human "pleasure"
for one utilitarian and "happiness" for another.7 5 "[D]eliberations
in normative ethics are to some extent dependent upon and cannot
be completely detached from metaethical considerations.17 If util-
itarianism is anything more than a mere mathematical formula for
quantifying competing results in a moral vacuum, the utilitarian
72. Fletcher, Ethics and Health Care Delivery: Computers and Distributive Justice,
in ETHICS AND HEALTH POL'Y 107, 108 (R. Veatch & A. Branson eds. 1976).
73. Hare, Ethics: Utilitarianism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 424-28 (W. Reich
ed. 1978).
74. Id.
75. T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 7 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter T.
MAPPES AND J. ZEMBATY].
76. Id. at 2.
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theory must either assume or supply natural moral values by which
those results can ultimately be evaluated-to determine whether
the resulting norms create more "good" or less "good." Thus, the
utilitarian formula determines greatest good as a function of two
factors - the empirical number of people involved and the ethical
value assigned to the effect upon those people. Even a pure cost-
benefit analysis assumes a value standard that defines a benefit
(good) as distinct from a cost (bad).
The form of utilitarianism known as "rule-utilitarianism" ap-
pears to somewhat acknowledge that principles beneath the sur-
face of normative quantification ultimately figure into the formula
of what is the greatest good. Rule-utilitarianism is the judging of
what is a right policy or act on the basis of a set of principles that
promote the greatest general good. 77 This is a second-order type of
inquiry, in which individual acts are not judged according to their
utility (act-utilitarianism), 78 but which acts are judged according to
a set of principles, which, if generally followed, would manifest the
greatest good.
7 9
Utilitarianism may now be seen in a more complicated light: a
formula by which alternate consequences may be compared, not
simply in terms of numerical impact (greatest number), but also by
assigning a basic value to those impacts, whether derived from im-
plicit moral notions of good or from generally accepted principles
which are deemed to most often promote that implicit good. Given
this characterization of utilitarianism, the standard constitutional
balancing test of competing "rights" can now be analyzed as essen-
tially utilitarian in nature. 0
77. Branson, Health Care: Theories of Justice and Health Care, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BIOETHICS 631 (W. Reich ed. 1978).
78. T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY, supra note 75.
79. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 5 (1979).
80. For example, a court faced with balancing the defamation claim of a plaintiff
against the first amendment claims of a defendant might decide that the first amendment
interest, if protected, would provide the greatest good for the most people, based on either
(1) the general principle that the free flow of information and the "free marketplace of
ideas" most often lead to the greatest political discourse and governmental responsibility (or
perhaps greatest economic efficiency, or even basic "liberty"), or (2) the intrinsic worth of
freedom or free speech which itself represents the "good" to be coupled with the numerical
measure of those affected. Conversely, the court might decide that the first amendment
interest would produce less good-either (1) because it involved less people, or (2) the re-
sulting good was qualitatively less as compared to the good derived from deterring and rem-
edying defamation by allowing the claim, or (3) the good was lesser as a function of both
numbers and the type of good produced. Again, the "good" could be derived from either a
general principle-that protecting one's good name, community standing, or business repu-
tation ultimately produces the greatest "good" (whether seen in ultimate terms of happi-
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The holding of Roe v. Wade is derived from, and limited by, the
balancing test of competing rights typical of constitutional theory:
"We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." 81
From this language, it is clear that the Court considered the in-
terests of two parties: pregnant women and the state. The opinion
also suggests the Court acknowledged other interests that might be
involved in the abortion decision: the interest of fetuses ("the de-
veloping young in the human uterus" as the Court says at one
point)8 2 and the interest of physicians involved in abortion
decisions. 83
A state court evaluating a wrongful birth cause of action is of
course bound by stare decisis and the holding of Roe v. Wade. But
the precedential effect of the Roe decision may be illusory when
the "right" to recover for wrongful birth is seen as a right of an
entirely different nature than the privacy right in Roe. This pre-
mise is possible when the "right" to sue for wrongful birth is un-
derstood to be the product of a significantly different balancing
process involving different parties and different consequences than
those in the Supreme Court's evaluation of the abortion choice. Of
course, a state court cannot relitigate Roe v. Wade, and might at
first blush feel constrained to adopt the relative weights assigned
to the competing interests by the Supreme Court in Roe. However,
this view of Roe v. Wade as binding on an evaluation of a wrongful
birth claim is avoidable by recognizing that the competing inter-
ests in Roe were identified and weighed strictly within the confines
of the operative facts of Roe and the context of the policy choices
at issue in that decision. In any event, a utilitarian analysis on a
theoretical level is not bound by rules of res judicata or stare de-
cisis. An evaluation of fetal rights implicated in a wrongful birth/
life action readily demonstrates these distinctions.
1. The Rights of "The Developing Young"
The Roe Court acknowledged an argument "on the theory that a
ness, pleasure, liberty, or whatever value "good" represents)-or the "good" could simply be
the value intrinsically represented by personal dignity and reputation.
81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
82. Id. at 159.
83. Id. at 163.
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new human life is present from the moment of conception, ' 84 but
rejected the idea that such a human life should be accorded status
as an independent factor in the balancing test. Instead, the Court
accorded only secondary status to any new humans developing in
the womb as being "potential life" subsumed under the state in-
terest.85 The Court appeared unwilling to decide whether a fetus
represented more than "potential" life: "We need not resolve the
difficult question of when life begins."8 But, in refusing to decide,
a decision was made-the life represented by the unborn was not
an independent interest to be considered in the Roe balancing.
This conclusion by the Court is clear from its analysis of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court acknowledged an argument
"that the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . If this suggestion of personhood
is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fe-
tus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment. '87 However, the Court concluded that "the word
'person', as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include
the unborn." 88 Such unborn children have no independent "right
to life" to be weighed in the Roe interest-balancing test.
The Roe Court considered fetal rights not as an independent fac-
tor to be balanced, but only to the extent that such rights are re-
flected in the state interest in "potential life." A state court, how-
ever, might assign a utilitarian value to fetal rights per se,
reasoning that the Supreme Court consideration of fetal rights was
not binding because: (1) that Court did not decide the question of
when life begins, and hence a state court would be free to assign
value to the actual life represented by a fetus as well as the "po-
tential life;" (2) the fetal interest in Roe was balanced only against
the pregnant woman's privacy interest, and the balancing in the
wrongful birth action is of a different order, involving not only the
abortion decision, but the effect of the cause of action itself on
fetuses (i.e., Roe is limited on its facts and issues); or (3) the four-
teenth amendment analysis that the term "person" does not in-
clude the unborn, is, again, limited to constitutional issues and bal-
ancing, and does not reach to the balancing of the competing
policy ramifications of creating a new type of tort claim.
84. Id. at 150.
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 159.
87. Id. at 156-57.
88. Id. at 158.
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The Roe view of fetal rights, when fitted into the utilitarian
model, suggests that the numerical value ("greatest number") are
those citizens represented by the state, and the intrinsic value
("greatest good") is the value of life watered down to a "potential"
level. In contrast, a state court affording fetal life independent
worth would add to the balance not only the number of citizens as
represented by the state, interested in "potential life," but also a
stronger interest-the number of all fetuses to be affected by the
policy choices, and the value of their lives as actual life, like that of
their mothers', or of any human life.
An example of a court finding the Roe valuation of fetal rights as
non-binding is found in Transamerica Insurance Company v.
Bellefonte Insurance Company.89 The United States district court
in Transamerica considered the issue of whether a child, in the
fetal state, is a "person" capable, under the law, of sustaining bod-
ily injury. The plaintiff insurance company, in a declaratory judg-
ment action, argued that Roe v. Wade implied that a fetus is not
considered a legal person, and thus, no bodily injury to a "person"
could occur to a fetus under an insurance policy provision for bod-
ily injury to a person.
The court held otherwise, concluding that fetuses are persons ca-
pable of sustaining bodily injury. "The decision in Roe addressed
the respective interests of the state and mother and focused on the
woman's right of personal privacy in the context of a Texas crimi-
nal abortion statute. Whether an unborn person is a 'legal' person
was not a question decided by the Supreme Court."90 The court
relied on several cases that found a fetus has a separate existence
from the moment of creation."1 The court also cited cases from two
states that rejected another concept mentioned in Roe as a limita-
tion on fetal value-viability. In Kelly v. Gregory,92 a New York
court held that the legal existence of the child begins at concep-
tion. Although the child under consideration was injured in the
third month of pregnancy and could not have survived outside of
the womb, the court distinguished the notion of physical viability
from the legal principle of separateness to sustain fetal injury.9 3 In
Smith v. Brennan,4 the New Jersey Supreme Court likewise re-
89. 490 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
90. Id. at 937.
91. Id.
92. 282 A.D. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 ( N.Y. App. Div. 1953).
93. Id.
94. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
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jected the argument that a fetus must be viable before considered
capable of separately sustaining injury, based on the finding that a
child is in existence from the moment of conception and is not
merely considered a part of the mother's body."
The Transamerica decision, and the cases cited therein, suggest
that there is a legal basis for attaching independent significance to
the value of fetal life in both a practical rights-balancing determi-
nation or a theoretical evaluation of competing policies. A survey
of the field of fetal rights provides abundant examples from the
areas of tort, property, and criminal law which support this conclu-
sion that the unborn child is an independent person with rights
worthy of protection. This body of law suggests that the Supreme
Court's decision not to afford independent value to the "develop-
ing young" in a constitutional rights-balancing context is neither
an all-encompassing evaluation nor an absolute ascertainment of
fetal value.
William Prosser, surveying the state of tort law, summarized the
evolution in the legal status of the unborn child:
Prior to 1946, when a pregnant woman was injured, and her child as a
result was subsequently born in an injured or deformed condition, nearly all
of the decisions denied recovery to the child ...
(M)edical authority has long recognized that an unborn child is in exis-
tence from the moment of conception, and for many purposes its existence
is recognized by the law. It has been accorded legal status for various pur-
poses in equity, criminal law, property law, and tort law. . . All writers who
have discussed the problem have joined in condemning the total no-duty
rule and agree that the unborn child in the path of an automobile is as
much a person in the street as the mother, and should be equally protected
under the law.
Beginning . . . in 1946, a rapid series of cases, many of them expressly
overruling prior holdings, brought about a rather spectacular reversal of the
no-duty rule. The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in every juris-
diction to maintain an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and
if he dies of such injuries after birth an action will lie for his wrongful
death.6
As Prosser notes, the child must be born alive to recover from
prenatal injuries. But the "born alive rule" does not detract from
the value of the unborn child, its personhood, rights, or protection
to be afforded those rights (and consequent duties). Instead, the
"born alive rule" is a rule of medical jurisprudence produced by
95. Id.
96. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 367, 368 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
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the limitations on medical knowledge available to the common law
in the 16th and 17th centuries. Given the primitive knowledge of
life in the womb, live birth was an evidentiary standard required
to prove that the unborn child was alive and that the tortious acts
ultimately caused death or injury. Otherwise, it could not be estab-
lished that the child was alive in utero at the time of the defend-
ant's acts. Even after quickening, it was extremely difficult to de-
termine whether the child died before or during labor. 7 The born
alive rule persists despite today's medical technology because of
the fear of some courts of legislating a "new crime" without legisla-
tive approval."" It is a misconception of the rule to see it as a
threshold which fetal life must cross before it obtains independent
value worthy of legal protection.
Similarly, as to viability, Prosser notes that:
Viability ... does not affect the question of the legal existence of the un-
born, and therefore of the defendant's duty, and it is a most unsatisfactory
criterion, since it is a relative matter, depending on the health of the mother
and child and many other matters. . . . Certainly the infant may be no less
injured; and logic is in favor of ignoring the stage at which the injury occurs.
With recent advances in embryology and medical technology, medical proof
of causation in these cases has become increasingly reliable, which argues
for eliminating the viability or other arbitrary developmental require-
ment[s] altogether."
Other commentators have also attacked viability as an illogical and
meaningless factor in determining prenatal tort liability.100
As of 1987, twenty-two states still held to the born alive rule by
court decision.101 Courts in three states have abandoned the rule,
while others have abandoned the rule to some extent by statute.102
Prosser and other authorities have noted that all jurisdictions al-
low actions for prenatal injury for a child later born alive, and if
the child dies of such injuries after birth, an action for wrongful
death is recognized. 0 3 At least seventeen states have considered
and allowed recovery although such injuries were sustained at a
previable stage.10'
97. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal
Anachronisms, 21 VAL. UL. REV. 563, 575-76 (1987) [hereinafter Forsythe].
98. Id. at 598.
99. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 96, at 369.
100. Forsythe, supra note 97, at 626.
101. Id. at 595-96.
102. Id. at 596.
103. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 96, at 368.
104. Collins, supra note 30, at 680-81.
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Unborn children have been afforded the right to informed con-
sent to medical treatment by several courts, and, as noted in
Transamerica, several courts have explicitly recognized that a
child en ventre sa mere (the equivalent, in law, of in utero in
medicine) is a separate person from its conception. 105 In criminal
law, several states recognize an unborn child as a person in the
context of homicide or manslaughter statutes, 10 6 and at least three
states have enacted statutes recognizing "feticide" as a separate in-
dictable offense.10 7 These statutes have subsequently been upheld
against claims of unconstitutionality.10 8 At least three state courts
have held an unborn child to be within the contemplation of homi-
cide or vehicular homicide statutes. 0 9 Some states have child
abuse laws that extend protection to unborn children and establish
a duty to provide their necessities. 10 A few states have intervened
to require medical treatment in utero for an unborn child, implic-
itly recognizing that they represent lives worthy of protection."'
The common law has accorded unborn children property rights
for nearly 300 years. For purposes of inheritance, such children are
considered persons "in being.""' 2 Courts have consistently held
that the unborn are entitled to the appointment of guardians in
order to protect the child's interest in the property that represents
proceeds or the corpus of a trust."' This suggests a property right
and a fourteenth amendment due process concern. As with tort
causes of action, the unborn child's property rights are conditioned
on live birth merely because the benefits of those rights cannot be
enjoyed until birth. Rather than a substantive value judgment, live
birth is merely a procedural requirement, similar to venue or
standing, which must be met to enforce the intrinsic right."'
105. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935, 937 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
106. Forsythe, supra note 97, at 596 n.161.
107. Id. at 596 n.163.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 596 n.162.
110. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1988); Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App.
2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940); Metzger v. Poople, 98 Colo. 133, 53 P.2d 1189 (1936).
111. See Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient; Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 Am. J.L.
MED. 1, 20-22 (1983-84); Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interven-
tions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987).
112. 23 AM. Jun. 2d, Descent and Distribution 94 (1983).
113. Mabry v. Scott, 51 Cal. App. 2d 245, 124 P.2d 659, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670
(1942); Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
114. See Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 747 F.2d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir.
1984); Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 P.2d 806 (1940); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
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All of this provides a court wishing to weigh competing interests
a substantial legal basis from which to accord the unborn indepen-
dent significance. Moreover, recognition in tort law particularly,
and criminal law to some extent, that the unborn are "persons"
worthy of legal protection, provides additional foundation for
deeming the life in utero as inherently valuable, and not merely a
secondary concern of the state as "potential life."
The unborn child has been afforded rights sufficient for legal
protection in other areas of the law. A fetus has been held to be a
person under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.116 Unborn children,
though previable, have been found to be persons within the mean-
ing of insurance policies. " 6 In the wrongful birth area itself, courts
have recognized fetal rights.
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,1 7 the first case to consider a wrongful
birth action, the court rejected the claim based on a fundamental
"sanctity of life" ethical position. The decision by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey was pre-Roe, and expressly held that the right
of the child to live outweighs the parental right to abort:
It may have been easier for the mother and less expensive for the father to
have terminated the life of their child while he was an embryo, but these
alleged detriments cannot stand against the preciousness of the single
human life to support a remedy in tort. . . . [T]he right of their child to
live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional and
financial injury."
In reaching this conclusion, the court clearly set forth its value
judgment as to the intrinsic "good" that should be assigned life:
"It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it
however heavily burdened. . . . The right to life is inalienable in
our society. . . . The sanctity of the single human life is the deci-
sive factor in this suit in tort." '
A post-Roe court refused to recognize a wrongful birth claim in
Azzolino v. Dingfelder.120 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
based its decision primarily on the impossibility of determining
damages, but underlying this position of the court appears to be a
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D.
Conn. 1982).
116. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 747 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
118. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
120. 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985).
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recognition of the intrinsic value of life.
[We] conclude that life, even life with severe defects, cannot be an injury in
the legal sense. . . . 'It is one thing to compensate destruction; it is quite
another to compensate creation. This so-called "wrong" is unique: It is a
new and on-going condition. As life, it necessarily interacts with other
lives.""
Perhaps the most illogical of all acknowledgments of fetal rights
are those appearing in opinions upholding wrongful life tort claims.
In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Incorporated,'" the Supreme Court
of Washington recognized both a wrongful birth action on behalf of
the parents and a wrongful life action on behalf of the child. The
wrongful birth action was predicated upon the parents' right to
prevent the child's birth by abortion.2 3 Curiously, the court then
predicated the wrongful life action on the basis of the fetus being a
legal person.
Prenatal injuries to a fetus have been recognized as actionable in this state
for 20 years. . . . We now hold that a duty may extend to persons not yet
conceived at the time of a negligent act or omission.' 4 ... Such future
children were ... reasonably endangered by defendants' failure to take rea-
sonable steps to determine the danger of prescribing Dilantin for their
mother.' 5 We have held that the physicians' duty to inform the parents of
the risks associated with Dilantin extends to the unconceived children.'
The ethical problem posed by this language is obvious. On the
one hand, the court allows the parents a "right to choose" abor-
tion, 2 7 citing Roe v. Wade which considered the fetus as only "po-
tential life" and not a person within the protection of the four-
teenth amendment. On the other hand, the court deems the fetus a
legal person to which a doctor owes a duty. This is logically contra-
dictory. If the fetus is a person, to which a physician owes a duty
to avoid negligent injury, then the physician would also owe a duty
to that person not to inflict intentional harm, such as through
abortion. The only logically consistent theory by which abortion
would not be the killing of the person in utero would be through
the adoption of a second-class type of personhood, where that life
may be extinguished by the choice and permission of the parent,
121. Id. at 109, 112-13, 337 S.E.2d at 532.
122. 88 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
123. Id. at 472-73, 656 P.2d at 491.
124. Id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 495.
125. Id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 496.
126. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
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but otherwise, is protected from negligent doctors and other poten-
tial tortfeasors by a duty to avoid prenatal injuries.
The logic of the Harbeson court also calls for a conclusion that
the penumbral privacy right which permits abortion is exalted
above the very right to life of the person not yet out of the womb.
Other courts that would recognize wrongful life claims rely on sim-
ilar inconsistencies that accord the fetus value in order to create a
duty by the defendant, while still allowing disposability of the fe-
tus by the parents. A New York court saw this status as "the fun-
damental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human
being.
128
The wrongful birth action requires an interest analysis of the
rights of the unborn distinct from Roe for two reasons. First, state
courts and legislatures are free, outside of the abortion context, to
recognize the intrinsic value of a fetus, as demonstrated in tort,
property, and criminal law. Second, the wrongful birth cause of ac-
tion has unique implications for those in the category of the un-
born. Roe considered only the interests implicated by the abortion
choice. However, recognition of a wrongful birth/life action impli-
cates the interests of unborn children who would not have been
aborted given a free parental choice, but are aborted due solely to
the effects of the wrongful birth action on parental choice, dis-
cussed below.
12,
2. The Rights of Pregnant Women
In Roe, the Court expressly considered the rights of pregnant
women in its interest balancing analysis. In utilitarian terms, the
numerical factor in evaluating this interest would be all pregnant
women. The latent value judgment-the "good" to be measured to
determine the greatest good among policy alternatives-might be
seen as a "good" derived from an act-utilitarianism or from a rule-
utilitarianism. As the former, the good protected by the policy or
act being evaluated is intrinsic, and might be represented as "pri-
vacy." Some language of the Court supports this approach: "[O]nly
personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty'. are included in this guarantee
of personal privacy.
'130
128. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977), modified sub. noma.,
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
129. See infra text accompanying notes 133-71.
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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As rule-utilitarianism, the "good" created by the policy is mani-
fested through the general principle of privacy, which is a second-
level value that represents basic "good" manifested by several vari-
ous acts. The Court speaks of "a distressful life" (unhappiness?),
created by the pressures of maternity or additional offspring, and
forced on pregnant women by the denial of the abortion choice.
"Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There . .. [may be] distress, for all
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and. . . the prob-
lem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologi-
cally and otherwise, to care for it."''
Roe and its progeny unmistakably identify the primary interest
of the pregnant woman, to be protected from state intrusion, as
the free choice "whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" 13 2-a
choice encompassed by the protections of the right of privacy.
State recognition of the wrongful birth cause of action, however,
interferes with this choice in several ways.
First, the wrongful birth cause of action imposes liability on
physicians not previously existing at common law'33 nor created by
Roe v. Wade. This, in turn, creates a financial incentive for physi-
cians to recommend amniocentesis and genetic screening in bor-
derline cases, and in possibly most or all cases for the particularly
"cautious" physician.134 The incentive is simply to avoid liability
and, where there may be no liability, to avoid the costs of frivolous
litigation. For example, when New York recognized the wrongful
birth action, a prediction was made that legal implications would
lead to the use of amniocentesis in all pregnancies."3 5 A year later,
doctors were reporting use of amniocentesis on women below the
age of thirty-five even though amniocentesis was not medically in-
dicated. Fear of legal liability was a major factor cited for promot-
ing the procedure. 136
131. Id. at 153.
132. Id.
133. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 571.
134. Id. at 572.
135. Id. (citing Doctors Held Liable in Abnormal Births, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1978, at
B6, col. 4).
136. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 572 (cit-
ing Powledge, Prenatal Diagnosis: New Techniques, New Questions, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., June 1979, at 16)("Some physicians report that they use amniocentesis on women be-
low 35 years of age even though such women are not subject to an elevated risk of bearing a
child with a chromosomal anomaly. A major factor in promoting such practices, they ac-
knowledge, is fear of liability.").
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The financial incentive is not only to recommend prenatal
screening, but also to recommend abortion where diagnostic results
are borderline, or where the physician is "cautious. ' 137 Similarly,
the financial incentive would lead to recommendations to abort
where genetic screening has not been performed, and possibly not
even medically indicated, when the physician becomes concerned
that his failure to conduct such testing or recommend such proce-
dures could expose him to eventual liability.13
The tendency of physicians to employ defensive medicine in the
face of increasing tort liability is historically demonstrated1 9 and
is, in fact, the very basis for recognizing the wrongful birth
claim.140 Numerous commentators have predicted defensive over-
reaction resulting from increased recognition of wrongful birth ac-
tions. M  The practice appears to have already occurred in the field
of genetic screening. Maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein (AFP)
screening is a form of screening for fetal defects that employs such
diagnostic techniques as blood samples from pregnant women,
amniocentesis (to analyze the amniotic fluid), genetic counseling
and possibly ultrasound. Where these services are not available,
along with a high-quality laboratory, routine AFP screening does
more harm than good, increasing cost and parental anxiety and
causing unnecessary abortions.14'2 The American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) has informed its members that,
although such tests are useful where patients have had a previ-
ously affected child, routine AFP screening is "of uncertain
137. Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 155 (1974)
[hereinafter Friedman].
138. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 113, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (1985).
139. Capron, supra note 26, at 667 (citing Altman, Pole Indicates 3 in 4 Doctors Order
Extra Tests to Protect Against Suits, New York, Mar. 28, 1977, at 19).
140. Courts that recognize wrongful birth claims often reason that imposition of liabil-
ity on physicians is necessary to create "a strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the
harm." Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 85, 439 A.2d 110, 114-15 (1981). See also Smith v.
Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 241, 513 A.2d 341, 347 (1986) (no wrongful birth liability would "dilute
the standard of professional conduct").- Dissenting opinions in cases refusing to allow wrong-
ful birth claims echo this theory. See Hickman v. Group Health Plan, 396 N.W.2d 10, 19
(Minn. 1986) (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting); Azzolino, 315 N.C. at 124, 337 S.E.2d at 542 (Mar-
tin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This analysis proves too much. In order to
remedy the rare instances where physicians provide negligent genetic counseling, "a strong
incentive" is created, by threat of liability, which leads to a greater number of cases of
literal overkill. See text accompanying notes 141-70.
141. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 572;
Friedman, supra note 137, at 155.
142. Annas, Is a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is?, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 16 [hereinafter Annas].
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value."'14 An ACOG bulletin concluded that when coordination of
resources and services is not possible, the risks and costs appear to
outweigh the advantages, and a routine screening program should
not be implemented.""'
However, despite this technical bulletin from the ACOG, the
ACOG Department of Professional Liability issued its own bulletin
that noted the "professional liability implications" of the increas-
ing availability of AFP tests. The bulletin advises: "It is now im-
perative . . . that every prenatal patient be advised of the avai-
labilty of this test.. . . The physician who has fully discussed AFP
tests and follow-up testing with his or her patients . . . and who
has documented it in the chart should be in the best possible de-
fense position.
14 5
One commentator noted that routine use of AFP screening
would have counterproductive results for the health of women en-
gaged in exercising their reproductive choice. "[U]nrestricted use
of the AFP kits could increase the number of abortions of normal
infants, minimize identification of affected infants, and heighten
anxiety over the outcome of pregnancy.
' '14
1
As Roe v. Wade noted, abortion carries with it a health risk to
the pregnant woman.1 47 Not only is this risk increased when abor-
tions are increased through the imposition of wrongful birth liabil-
ity, but reproductive choice is skewed when normal children are
aborted that were desired and would have been chosen by the
mothers but for the pressures from the physician to screen or
abort."14
There is also an accuracy, or "predictability," problem with pre-
natal testing. First, there is the problem of counselor error.
As is true for other kinds of diagnosis, the process of reproductive counsel-
ing is strewn with opportunities for missteps. . . . A genetic counselor will
be expected to exercise reasonable care to supply an accurate diagnosis ...
Nevertheless, a counselor is not required, any more than is any other medi-
143. Id. at 16-17.
144. Id. at 17; see also Marmion, The California Alpha-Fetoprotein Screening Pro-
gram, 54 LINACRE Q., Feb. 1987, at 77-78 [hereinafter Marmion].
145. Annas, supra note 142, at 17 (emphasis added).
146. Nolan-Haley, Amniocentesis and Human Quality Control, 8 HuM. LIFE REv. 51,
53 (Spring 1982) (emphasis added)(citing 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 159 (1980)) [hereinafter Nolan-
Haley]; see also Marmion, supra note 144, at 79.
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
148. See, e.g., Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697,
512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987) (upheld mother's cause of action for psychological
injury due to her submission to an unnecessary abortion after genetic counselors had errone-
ously advised her that her baby would be born with severe defects).
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cal practitioner, to supply error-free explanations." 9
Second, there is the problem of errors inherent in the testing
technology. The only prenatal test ever considered as a possible
candidate for recommended use for all pregnant women in the
United States is the alpha-fetoprotein screening test (AFP).
"Properly administered, this series of tests detects 80 to 90 percent
of all anencephalies and 63 to 90 percent of all open spina bifidas.
More recently it has been shown that such testing may also detect
20 to 40 percent of all Down syndrome fetuses.""'5 However, the
problem with the AFP screening program is the lack of reliability.
"The test is falsely positive (that is, unaffected women will test as
if their baby is affected) in 95 percent of the cases.. . . The test is
falsely negative (that is, infants with NTD [neural tube defects]
who test as normal) in 22 percent of the cases."'' False positive
test results increase the level of maternal anxiety and cause some
women to secure abortions without further testing and confirma-
tion of the test result.152  This dramatically increases the
probability that children without disabilities will be aborted due to
parental fear of giving birth to a child with disabilities.
Moreover, amniocentesis is unable to differentiate between an
affected fetus and a mere carrier for most genetic diseases, which
means that many carriers would be aborted. This would, of course,
"deny life to a large number of unaffected offspring,"' 3 desired by
their parents but aborted due to the effects on the abortion choice
created by the pressures of wrongful birth tort liability.
Parental choice is skewed in another way by increased screening
generated by wrongful birth liability. Even where the fetus is af-
fected, in many cases it is impossible to predict with medical cer-
tainty whether the defect is extreme or minimal.15  Retardation
may be slight or severe. Persons with birth defects often lead
meaningful, happy lives and make valuable contributions to others.
But these relatively normal children, initally desired by parents,
will often be aborted because of the doubts and supposed severity
149. Capron, supra note 26, at 626-27.
150. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 142, at 16.
151. Marmion, supra note 144, at 79.
152. Id. See also Elias & Annas, Routine Prenatal Genetic Screening, 317 No. 22 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1407, 1408 (1987)("If these tests are to do more good than harm, their careful
validation will be essential, coupled with education of both practicing physicians and pa-
tients concerning their use.").
153. Friedman, supra note 137, at 108.
154. Fletcher, Prenatal Diagnosis: Ethical Issues, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS
1343 (R. Reich ed. 1978) [hereinafter Fletcher].
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of defects suggested by screening.'55
Testing technology also carries with it health risks. Experts have
calculated that amniocentesis presents a risk of fetal or maternal
injury of between one and two percent, such that at least a two
percent risk that a fetus is defective must exist before amni-
ocentesis is "warranted" even on a eugenic or wrongful birth ba-
sis. 15' However, where amniocentesis is not performed, the risk
that a child will be born with a neural tube defect (anencephally,
encephalocele and spina bifida) is 1.1,000, omphalocele (congenital
hernia) is 1/6,000, and Down syndrome is 1/800.157 The risks of
maternal injuries from amniocentesis include placental hemor-
rhage, perforation of the intestines, uterine infection and death.
15 8
Risks to the fetus include congenital abnormality, pregnancy com-
plications, spontaneous abortion, neo-natal death and stillbirth. 5 9
Thus, increased screening triggered by defensive medicine will sac-
rifice maternal health and healthy, "wanted" babies without any
net benefit to maternal choice.
Proponents of widespread prenatal testing have suggested that
the health hazards of amniocentesis and similar procedures are de-
clining as technology improves, the use of specialists increases and
expertise improves. 60 However, the increased use of sophisticated
technology and specialists introduces another factor which inter-
feres with reproductive choice. The increasing demand for screen-
ing procedures and the resultant increased costs may deprive lower
income families of an effective choice for such procedures. There
may be occasions when screening is medically indicated and would
provide a proven health benefit to the management of the preg-
nancy, but such procedures would be foregone due to the lack of
available resources or high costs generated by the increased use of
screening due to tort liability. It was noted above that routine AFP
testing, without adequate resources, would be counterproductive in
this respect. The FDA has questioned whether a sufficient supply
155. Id.
156. Friedman, supra note 137, at 105; Manganiello, Byrd, Tho & McDonough, A Re-
port of the Safety and Accuracy of Midtrimester Amniocentesis at the Medical College of
Georgia: Eight and One Half Years' Experience, 134 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 911,
914 (1979); Hanson, Tennant, Zorn & Samuels, Analysis of 2136 Genetic Amniocentesis:
Experience of a Single Physician, 152 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 436, 439 (1985).
157. Marmion, supra note 144, at 77, S0.
158. See supra note 156.
159. Id.
160. Fineberg & Peters, Amniocentesis in Medicine and Law, TRIAL, Feb. 1984, at 54-
56 [hereinafter Fineberg & Peters].
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of amniocentesis services exists to bear a significant increase in the
use of such procedures.1 Other commentators note the "en-
treprenurial response" to increased demand could lower quality
levels, leading to more errors and health hazards.
16 2
[O]ne of the biggest technical problems is the receiving and communicating
of accurate test results. Current laboratory services are overburdened and it
has been predicted that a major increase in demand may result in an unac-
ceptable error rate. Also, because this is a potential $100 million industry,
there is the additional concern that profit may take precedence over quality
control. "'S
Apart from medical and technological ramifications, further in-
terference with the parental right of reproductive choice is mani-
fested by the social pressures spawned by the wrongful birth cause
of action. What may begin as a right may become an obligation.
Ethicist John Fletcher has noted:
With the availability of the technology and know-how permitting preven-
tion of many genetically based congenital abnormalities, there may be de-
veloping as a corollary a social attitude which demands such use. In general,
if a congenital abnormality can be avoided, then it should be, and those
individuals who do not partake of these advances will be socially
ostracized. 14
Social coercion may be subtle yet still affect parental choice. If
prenatal screening becomes widely promoted, public pressure will
create subtle coercion to test and abort, or "guilt for women who
decline to have the test performed."'16 5 Parents who choose to give
birth to an "abnormal" child may be deemed "irresponsible. ' 16 6 A
California court of appeal put it this way:
If a case arose where, despite due care by the medical profession in trans-
mitting the necessary warnings, parents made a conscious choice to proceed
with a pregnancy, with full knowledge that a seriously impaired infant
would be born, that conscious choice would provide an intervening act of
proximate cause to preclude [wrongful life] liability insofar as defendants
other than the parents are concerned. Under such circumstances, we see no
sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answera-
ble for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought upon their
161. Nolan-Haley, supra note 146, at 54.
162. Fineberg & Peters, supra note 160, at 59.
163. Nolan-Haley, supra note 146, at 55.
164. Id. at 63.
165. Id.; see also Fineberg & Peters, supra note 160, at 59.
166. Koop, The Slide to Auschwitz, 8 HuM. LIFE REV. 19, 22 (Summer 1982) (quoting




Where the wrongful birth cause of action employs an objective
test to determine whether the mother of a defective child would
have undergone the procedure, the implication broadcast to society
by a decision allowing recovery is that a reasonable person would
abort a fetus with similar defects. 
1 8
If court decisions establish prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders as a duty
owed to all parents at risk of bearing a genetically impaired child, a long,
albeit unconscious, step will have been taken in the direction of removing
this application of technology from the realm of personal decision-making
and transferring it into the class of judgments known as "medical indica-
tions." This subtle change in professional and public awareness will have
far-reaching implications. Social pressures may well inhibit, rather than re-
inforce autonomous decision-making by parents who would choose to give
birth to a child with substantial impairments.0 9
Several commentators have noted the probability that economic
pressures would also come to bear on the reproductive choice, in
the form of insurance policies.' 70 Health insurance companies al-
ready bear a substantial portion of the cost of genetic disease.
Those carriers that cover large numbers of employed persons and
their families would have significant financial incentive, given the
legal duties and social climate engendered by wrongful birth liabil-
ity, to offer only plans that require, as a condition of coverage, that
the insured and spouse undergo broad genetic screening. The
mother would be required to undergo amniocentesis routinely. If
test results showed the fetus to be affected, it will be aborted at
company expense. If such a fetus is carried to term, the delivery
and child-rearing expenses will not be covered by the policy.'
At the very least, the imposition of tort liability for wrongful
birth/life would have profound effects on the right of reproductive
choice, effects not contemplated by nor implicit in the balancing
167. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 830, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 488 (1980).
168. See, e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 123, 337 S.E.2d 528, 541 (1985)
(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applicable statute established objec-
tive standard to determine whether the patient would have undergone abortion, thus al-
lowing recovery for wrongful birth would require jury finding that reasonable person would
have aborted child under the circumstances).
169. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 572-73.
170. Friedman, supra note 137, at 111 n.123; Comment, Liability for Negligent Prena-
tal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 573 (citing Thompson & Greenfield, Rights and Responsibili-
ties of the Insurer, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 289 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976)).




analysis of Roe. In fact, in the wrongful birth context, the privacy
right of choice enunciated in Roe conflicts with the recognition of a
right to recover for wrongful birth/life and its medical ramifica-
tions. Physicians are already reporting that some of their number
are using amniocentesis on women below thirty-five years of age,
out of fear of tort liability, even though such women are not sub-
ject to an elevated risk of bearing defective children.
172
The effects attendant to increased routine screening (the health
hazards, interference with parental choice, and abortion of healthy
unborn children) all suggest that the recognition of wrongful birth/
life actions has serious negative effects on both the rights of the
parents and those of unborn children-negative effects which
clearly differentiate an evaluation of wrongful birth/life claims
from the balancing of privacy and state interest in Roe.
3. The State Interests
Following the utilitarian model, the raw numerical value to be
attached to the state interest (as the "greatest number") is the
number of all those represented by the state-the citizens. The
good (as in "greatest good") again may be derived either from a
general rule designed to lead most often to the greatest "utility"
and implicit good, or from an implicit good per se, without the
imposition of the intermediate principle. In dealing with the state
interest, the Supreme Court in Roe comes close to recognizing an
intrinsic value-life. The Court appears to acknowledge life as a
basic value in two different aspects: the "potential" life173 of the
"developing young in the human uterus, ' 17 " and the life (and thus
the health) of the mother.
As to "potential" life, the Court offers no deeper analysis than
the fundamental position that "[iin assessing the State's interest,
recognition may be given to the . . . claim that as long as at least
potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the
protection of the pregnant woman alone. 17 5 As noted, the Court
found it unnecessary to "resolve the difficult question of when life
begins, 1 76 although, logically, such a resolution seems necessitated
by a balancing test that recognizes intrinsic value in potential life.
172. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 572.
173. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
174. Id. at 159.
175. Id. at 150 (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 159.
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Surely, if potential life has value, actual life would then be even
more valuable, and would seem, to be consistent, to weigh as heav-
ily in the balance as the actual life of the mother. Thus, a determi-
nation is required of when actual, rather than potential, life begins
in order to ensure a proper balance.
As to the life of the mother, and the corollary maternal health,
the Court is emphatic that this is a value that must be given great
weight when regulating the abortion choice. During the first tri-
mester, the decision is left to the medical judgment of the preg-
nant woman's attending physician. 71 During the subsequent tri-
mester, "the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health. ' 178 In the final tri-
mester, the state may regulate except where it interferes with the
preservation of "the life or health of the mother.
1 7 9
The Roe Court summarized the state interests, and underlying
each is the intrinsic value of life. "[A] State may properly assert
important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical
standards, and in protecting potential life." 180 The Court then bal-
anced these interests against the privacy right accorded the "po-
tential" mother. "At some point in pregnancy, these respective in-
terests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the
factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right in-
volved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.
1 81
The wrongful birth evaluation implicates an additional state in-
terest not found within Roe: the interests of all citizens with disa-
bilities. As noted at the outset of this article, and as the foregoing
discussion demonstrates, the wrongful birth claim involves a dis-
tinction between babies who are disabled and those who are nor-
mal. A premise of the wrongful birth action is that the child's very
existence as disabled is a legally cognizable wrong causing "dam-
ages."' 82 A second premise is that the child with disabilities should
have been aborted.'83 The legal and social judgment is that the dis-
abled child's life is not worth living and that non-existence is not
177. Id. at 163.
178. Id. at 164.
179. Id. at 163-164.
180. Id. at 154.
181. Id.
182. Horan & Valentine, The Doctor's Dilemma: Euthanasia, Wrongful Life, and the
Handicapped Newborn, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 32, 39 (D. Horan &




only preferable, but of measurably greater value than life with dis-
abilities. 84 "The idea that a handicapped child would lead a life
that should better never have been lived, or that the parents are
'damaged' by that child's presence in their family, bespeaks. . . a
pervasive social prejudice against the handicapped .
The logic of the wrongful birth claim implicitly sets forth a "ra-
tional basis" for distinguishing between infants who are healthy
and those who are disabled, so that discrimination and fourteenth
amendment equal protection arguments against the cause of action
might seem precluded. But the stigmatization and high toll on the
self-esteem of persons with disabilities cannot be denied where the
courts and society are proclaiming that persons with disabilities
are of less value than an aborted fetus. Moreover, if a state-created
wrongful birth action is based on irrational prejudice against the
disabled, such state action is subject to constitutional attack.1
6 It
is irrational to prefer abortion over life with a disability, and to
find parents damaged by the life of a disabled child when it is rec-
ognized that these beliefs pre-judge the value of an individual life
and invoke speculation and "judgments that are beyond the moral
abilities of courts, legislatures, or society as a whole, to make.'
1 87
Constitutional questions aside, the recognition of the wrongful
birth action contravenes public policies protective of persons with
disabilities. States commonly have expressed public policies ex-
tending extra protection and assistance to persons with disabili-
ties.' Some states require, by statute, health insurance policies
and health maintenance plans to include, from the moment of
birth, dependents with disabilities. 8 9 Many states have educa-
tional programs which attempt to instill an attitude that students
with disabilities, often called "exceptional students," are of
184. Id. at 48.
185. Valentine, When the Law Calls Life Wrong, 8 HUM. LIFE REV. 46, 52 (Summer
1982) [hereinafter Valentine].
186. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)
(struck down a restrictive zoning ordinance based on "an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded").
187. Valentine, supra note 185, at 52-53.
188. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 62A.042, 62A.14, and 62A.141 (West 1986) (Minnesota insur-
ance law requiring health insurance policies and health maintenance plans which cover a
subscriber's dependents to include from the moment of birth any dependent with disabili-
ties. The coverage is required to continue beyond the usual limiting age of coverage if the
handicapped dependent is unable to support himself. Coverage for medical care arising out





Federal policy likewise encourages the care and education of per-
sons with disabilities, for example, as expressed in the Education
of the Handicapped Act'91 and a federal statute that provides
grants to states that offer free public education to disabled chil-
dren. 192 Also, the Child Abuse Amendment of 1984 provides that
states receiving federal funds for child abuse agencies are required:
1) to regard withholding of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions as a form of child
neglect; and 2) to establish mechanisms through state agencies to
protect infants with disabilities.'93
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 declares a federal
policy which values and protects the handicapped: "No otherwise
qualified individual with handicaps in the United States. . .shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. .. .
Federal courts have also followed a nondiscrimination policy to-
ward children with disabilities. For example, the District Court for
the District of Columbia has declared that mentally retarded chil-
dren are entitled to a public education equal to that of other
youths.'95
Against this backdrop of policy protecting citizens with disabili-
ties, recognition of the wrongful birth claim creates a jurispruden-
tial contradiction: a legal system that at once encourages the de-
struction of "defective" lives before birth and seeks to protect
those lives after birth.'9O In the courts, the life of a "defective"
child might be regarded as a legal "wrong" causing compensable
190. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 120.17, 252A.01-.21 (West Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, § 13-101 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. ED. CODE6 § 56300-381 (West Supp. 1988).
191. Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400-85 (West Supp. 1988).
192. 20 U.S.C.A. § 2771-72 (West Supp. 1988).
193. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5101-03 (West Supp. 1988).
194. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988).
195. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). While parents in a
wrongful birth context might claim they would have aborted their child, if provided prenatal
screening, because they lacked resources and thus are economically damaged by birth of the
child, the court in Mills noted that the school district could not justify its failure to provide
handicapped with education on par with other students on the ground that the district
lacked sufficient economic resources. Id. at 876. See also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
196. Rosenblum & Grant, The Legal Response to Babies Doe: An Analytical Progno-
sis, 1 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 391 (1986).
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damages to its parents, yet in the schools that life is expected to be
accorded value equal to nondisabled children.
In a broader sense, the wrongful birth action implicates the in-
terests of living children, even those not disabled, by undermining
the basic policy behind child abuse statutes. Potential mothers are
counseled that certain unborn children should be terminated
before birth, but after birth, those mothers are subject to criminal
prosecution for acts essentially similar. The possibility of recovery
encourages parents of a child with disabilities to accept and testify,
in court, that the child's life is an expensive injury to them-a
wrong and an injustice-while at home they are under a legal obli-
gation to value that "life" and care for their child.
4. The Interests of Medicine and Society
The Roe Court paid deference to the ethical integrity of the
medical profession in the abortion choice, but it is unclear how
much weight the Court accorded the physician's privilege of fol-
lowing his own medical judgment. As noted, during the first tri-
mester, the pregnant woman does not have an entirely free choice
to abort. The actual choice is left to the medical judgment of her
physician. 197 The Court claims this "vindicates the right of the
physician to administer medical treatment according to his profes-
sional judgment up to the points where important state interests
provide compelling justifications for intervention. ' 198 While this
"right" may have been "vindicated," it was never balanced against
competing interests. No value was assigned to "professional judg-
ment." Without independent weight, the physician's "right" ap-
pears derivative, dependent on the privacy right in order to survive
in the face of the state interest in regulating the abortion decision.
Moreover, what the Court grants as a "right" on one hand becomes
liability9 on the other.
Up to those points (where the state interests justify regulation), the abor-
tion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical deci-
sion, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an indi-
vidual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical
judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are
available.
2 0 0
197. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).
198. Id. at 165-66.
199. HOHFELD, supra note 35, at 59 ("Perhaps the nearest synonym of 'liability' is
'subjection' or 'responsibility.' ").
200. 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
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In summary, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe is grounded
not upon the right of a woman to control her body, but on "the
right of the physician to administer medical treatment according
to his professional judgment." 0' 1 Prior to the point when a state
has a compelling interest in the pregnancy, the physician's medical
judgment and its effectuation are to be "free of interference by the
State."20 2 After that point, an "appropriate medical judgment" re-
garding the health of the mother may still override state
regulation.0 3
Throughout the Roe progeny, the Court has continued to defer
to the physician's privilege to exercise his professional judgment.
In Doe v. Bolton 204 and Beal v. Doe,20 5 the Court noted that med-
ical judgments relating to abortion should be exercised in light of
factors relating to the health of the patient.2 °0 The physician is to
be allowed "the room he needs to make his best medical judg-
ment. 20 7 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Dan-
forth,"8 the Court defined a physician's duty of informed consent
as "the giving of information to the patient as to just what would
be done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than
this might well confine the attending physician in an undesired
and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession. "209
The critical point of viability, at which time the state may deny
the pregnant woman the right to abort, was not a determination to
be made by courts or the legislature, but was to be left to the med-
ical judgment of the doctor: "[W]e recognized in Roe that viability
was a matter of medical judgment. . . and we preserved the flexi-
bility of the term."21 0
In Colautti v. Franklin,2 1' the Court reaffirmed the primary role
of the medical professional in determining the point at which abor-
tion may be prohibited. "[N]either the legislature nor the courts
may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment
201. Id. at 165.
202. Id. at 163.
203. Id. at 165.
204. 410 U.S. 179 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
205. 432 U.S. 438 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
206. 410 U.S. at 192; 432 U.S. at 441 n.3.
207. 410 U.S. at 192; 432 U.S. at 441 n.3 (citing 410 U.S. at 192).
208. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
209. Id. at 67 n.8.
210. Id. at 64.
211. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
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of viability .. ."212 Regarding diagnostic testing, such as amni-
ocentesis, the Court has held that "[t]he mode and procedure of
medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges."2 3 Re-
garding requirements that physicians inform pregnant women of
available techniques or conditions relating to the health of her fe-
tus, in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,21" the
Court struck down state created requirements that an "attending
physician" inform his patient of complications that may result if
she chose to abort the child. Requiring physicians to recite certain
information was seen as an intrusion upon the discretion of the
physician."'
Similarly, the imposition of wrongful birth liability upon physi-
cians for failing to inform a prospective mother of complications
that would result if she chose to give birth, or of available diagnos-
tic procedures, creates an intrusion upon the professional judg-
ment of medical personnel. As noted above,216 medical judgments
are distorted, and often placed aside, where tort liability or the
fear of litigation create financial incentives to employ defensive
medicine. Medical judgments are no longer exercised according to
factors relating to the patient's health. Financial considerations
will dictate application of defensive medical procedures.
[T]he proliferation of successful wrongful birth actions will have the ines-
capable result of placing physicians under a legal duty to perform, or at
least to recommend or to suggest, some type of prenatal defect diagnostic
test during every pregnancy that comes under his care. As the wrongful
birth concept gains acceptance, no doctor who values his economic security
will be able to afford not to prescribe such evaluations.21
Aside from financial considerations, if the wrongful birth claim is
brought under the doctrine of informed consent,218 which requires
the physician to tell the patient "what a reasonable patient would
want to know under the circumstances, ' 219 the physician is again
212. Id. at 388-89.
213. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-08 (1979).
214. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
215. Id. at 442.
216. See text accompanying notes 133-45.
217. Horan & Valentine, supra note 182, at 45.
218. See, e.g., Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 123, 337 S.E.2d 508, 540 (1985)
(Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, 396
N.W.2d 10, 12 (Minn. 1986).
219. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Capron, supra note 25, at 629; Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal
Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 564-65.
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required to act in a manner unrelated to the health of his pa-
tient.2 0 "The result of imposing the lay informed consent standard
in the field of prenatal diagnosis would be to coerce medical practi-
tioners to participate in the parents' pursuit of the perfect child,
by placing those practitioners who decline such a role at risk of
incurring civil liability.
221
"Wrong sex" abortions are the most obvious example of how
physicians might be required to give information for non-therapeu-
tic purposes. One study found that a majority (twenty-nine out of
forty-six) of assumedly "reasonable" women who learned from
amniocentesis that their children would be girls chose to abort.222
Only one woman out of a group of fifty-three that learned their
children would be boys chose to abort.223 Examples of sexual pref-
erence abortions, which end the lives of healthy unborn children
merely because they are of the "wrong" sex-almost always female,
are widespread and increasing.2 24 Such practices would become
predominant with the proliferation of wrongful birth claims lead-
ing to routine prenatal testing. Requiring physicians to undertake
such procedures would violate the medical and personal judgment
of many.
Not only would physician judgment be hampered in individual
cases, but wrongful birth liability and consequent screening re-
quirements would interfere with the medical profession's duty of
"determining the proper allocation of health care re-
sources ... ."225 It would be the consumer/patients, those who ul-
timately bear the cost of increased malpractice liability, that would
suffer from non-medical intrusions into physician decision-
making.226
The privilege of the physician to exercise his medical judgment
is not his only interest at stake. A physician may have rights of
conscience that would be violated by requiring him to impart in-
formation or treatment which would facilitate an abortion decision
or the practice of eugenic selection.22 7 Objections on the basis of
conscience might arise from medical considerations, such as a pro-
220. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 565.
221. Id. at 566.
222. Id. at 566 n.100 (citing C. RICE, BEYOND ABORTION 98 (1979)).
223. Id.
224. Nolan-Haley, supra note 146, at 56, 57.
225. Comment, Liability for Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 566.
226. Id.
227. Weber, Are Wrongful Birth Suits Unconstitutional?, in STATUS CALL, Fall 1985,
at 1-2 [hereinafter Weber].
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fessional evaluation of the health risks involved in the objectiona-
ble procedures, or an application of medical ethics.2 28 A physician's
objection may also arise from moral considerations such as the
widespread pro-life philosophy or personal beliefs based on indi-
vidual experiences with abortion of children.229
The Akron decision represents the flip side of wrongful birth suits. Just as
the state cannot require a physician to speak and give indirect support to
the philosophy that human life in the womb deserves respect and protec-
tion, so the state cannot require an obstetrician to speak and give indirect
support to the philosophy of eugenics and prenatal genetic selection.23
The rights of freedom from compulsory expression and freedom
of thought, recognized by the Supreme Court in Wooley v. May-
nard 31 and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette,3 2 may be violated by imposing on physicians liability for
failing to facilitate abortions and eugenic selection.233 The right of
privacy, the determinant in Roe, may also be implicated. One ob-
server has noted: "An individual's refusal, on moral grounds, to
participate in performing an abortion is an exercise of conscience
protected by the same right of privacy which now protects the wo-
man's right to choose an abortion. '23 4 As noted, wrongful birth lia-
bility could eventually lead to a standard for every obstetrician-
patient relationship that eugenic screening be discussed or em-
ployed. Such a procedure would not only be highly intrusive into
the professional physician-client relationship, but would also in-
trude into the personal philosophies of many doctors and
patients. 3 5
"A physician cannot suggest eugenic screening and selection
without by that very suggestion granting credibility and support
for the eugenic philosophy. '231 Should the doctor recommend
against a standard procedure, he may not only risk incurring liabil-
ity, but by being forced to note his objection, or by being forced to
recommend another physician who might meet the required stan-
dard without moral misgivings, the doctor is compelled to call at-
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 7.
231. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
232. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
233. Weber, supra note 227, at 1.
234. Horan & Valentine, supra note 182, at 46 (quoting Professor Lynn Wardle of
Brigham Young University).




tention to a practice which he believes should have no place in
medicine. 3 7
It solves little to allow the objecting obstetrician to refer his pa-
tient to a doctor who actively participates in genetic screening and
abortion. The required recommendation is merely a forced partici-
pation, a burden on the first physician's right to object. Such a
recommendation may be the moral equivalent of participating in
or facilitating the actual abortion.23 8 "Thus, it can be said logically
that the creation of a legal duty for physicians to perform up to a
given standard of care in the field of pre-natal genetic diagnosis
could well lead to serious interference with a doctor's protected
right to individual conscience."2 39
The pressure on the physician may be more direct, and may be
of a type that cannot be avoided even by referring the patient to
another doctor. As noted above,2"" pressure from insurance carriers
might force expectant mothers to obtain genetic testing. The
probability is even greater that medical malpractice insurers will
require physicians to provide prenatal screening to avoid liability.
Those that refuse would lose the insurance coverage necessary for
them to practice their profession.2" 1
Wrongful birth liability forces some obstetricians out of the pro-
fession simply by requiring them, directly or indirectly, to partici-
pate in abortion and eugenic practices." 2 Thus, state action recog-
nizing wrongful birth claims may be subject to constitutional
challenge. The Supreme Court held in Sherbert v. Verner24 3 and
Thomas v. Review Board,2 4 that the state cannot force an individ-
ual "to choose between following the precepts of religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand."
24 5
For all physicians, regardless of personal philosophy, the
proliferation of prenatal screening will pressure medical judgment
through the two-edged sword of the malpractice suit. A physician
may be sued for failing to recommend amniocentesis and thus per-
237. Id. at 7.
238. Valentine, supra note 185, at 48-49.
239. Id. at 49.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
241. Valentine, supra note 185, at 47.
242. Weber, supra note 227, at 4-7.
243. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
244. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
245. 374 U.S. at 404; 450 U.S. at 716-17.
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mitting the birth of an infant with disabilities-a suit for wrongful
birth. Or, as has happened, a physician may recommend amni-
ocentesis, which results in abortion, only to find the aborted fetus
was healthy-leading to a suit for wrongful death.2 4
The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently considered the inter-
ests of medicine and society in the context of a wrongful birth ac-
tion in Hickman v. Group Health Plan.247 In Hickman, a Minne-
sota statute which prohibited wrongful birth actions was declared
unconstitutional by a county court. The state supreme court re-
versed, upholding the statute's constitutionality. 4 In considering
the plight of the doctor when faced with a wrongful birth cause of
action, the court wrote:
What is the doctor's choice? By advising the patient about amniocentesis
.. . there is as high as a 1 in 100 chance that the fetus will be injured . .. ;
by not advising about the test, there is as high as a 1 in 350 chance that the
child will be born with mental or physical defects. With either alternative,
the doctor would be subject to . . . suit. How could the court require the
state to provide a cause of action against a doctor faced with this Hobson's
choice? . . . [W]e cannot and should not place the doctor in an impossible
situation, interfering with and perhaps thwarting his or her professional
judgment....
[D]octors must be returned some leeway in exercising judgment affecting
the treatment of their patients without the fear of legal sanction. 49
II. THERE Is No COMMON LAW BASIS FOR THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER FOR WRONGFUL BIRTH
The extension of the constitutional right of privacy to the abor-
tion decision provided the gravamen for a wrongful birth
claim-that the defendant's negligence precluded the parental
choice of aborting the unborn child.2 50 But it is the application of
the common law tort framework which has provided the basis for
judicial recognition of the claim.2 51 Thus, a wrongful birth action
246. Friedman, supra note 137, at 143 n.261.
247. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 14.
250. Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 31 DEF. L.J. 555, 561, 576 (1982); Note, A Major Step
Forward in the Evolution of Wrongful Life, supra note 30, at 209; Comment, Liability for
Negligent Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 1, at 570.
251. E.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d 483, 489
(1983); Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d 100, 113 (N.Y. App. div. 1977),
rev'd in part sub nom., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975);
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must meet the required elements of the standard negligence action:
duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages.25
The adaptation of these elements to the wrongful birth fact pat-
tern raises jurisprudential questions which cannot be addressed in
detail within the scope of this article, but which nevertheless
demonstrate that recognition of the wrongful birth claim entails
more than mere application of established principles, and instead
requires major revision of fundamental concepts of traditional
justice.2 5
A. Damages: When Is Life A "Wrong"?
"The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured
party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in
had it not been for the wrong of the other party.''254 Thus, if a car
is stolen, the remedy is to replace or restore the car to its owner. If
a person has been injured, the best remedy is to provide treatment
which restores the plaintiffs health, usually through the awarding
of monetary damages for medical expenses. Where health or life
cannot be restored, monetary damages are awarded to replace, as
much as possible, the benefits the health or life would have
provided.
Theoretically, it would be simple to restore plaintiffs to their
original position in a wrongful birth or wrongful life action. The
plaintiff child complains that he is alive and alleges that he prefers
nonexistence. The plaintiff parents claim they are injured by hav-
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975).
252. E.g., 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899; 98 Wash. 2d at
467-68, 656 P.2d at 489.
253. Although a number of these questions are noted infra, several are not. Some ex-
amples: One underlying policy issue presented by the wrongful birth claim is who should
bear the cost for the care and treatment of children with disabilities? Should the responsi-
bility for infants with disabilities be shifted to the medical profession? What effects on the
delivery of medical care, costs, and the health of others would result? When parents choose
to procreate, do they assume some risk that they might bear children with disabilities, or
have advances in prenatal diagnostic technology shifted the risk to health care profession-
als? Should social institutions, governmental or charitable, bear a greater responsibility for
the care and the costs of persons with disabilities? Will wrongful birth liability detract from
the incentive or impetus of such institutions to participate? If liability should be shifted,
and viewing negligence law as a means of social engineering (see Pound, Theory of Social
Interests, 15 Pub. Am. Soc. 16 (1920)), is common law tort liability the most desirable in-
strument to effect change?
254. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 899 (1958); see also Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867); Miller v. Rob-
ertson, 266 U.S. 243, 257 (1924) (contract); Tucker v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 356 F. Supp.
709, 711 (D. Md. 1973) (tort).
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ing a living child, an injury which they would have avoided by
abortion. The most effective and inexpensive remedy would be to
kill the child.
Most segments of society would be abhorred by this sugges-
tion,255 and this social repugnance toward actually returning the
plaintiffs to their original position points up the philosophic
problems of the wrongful birth action. The various legal and philo-
sophic arguments against killing the child-that he is a human be-
ing, that he has value, that the "remedy" is murder, that it is
against the public policies behind criminal statutes and social wel-
fare legislation, that it is discrimination against persons who are
disabled, that it decreases respect for life in other areas, that it
violates basic morals concerning the value of life, or violates the
child's natural rights-are also arguments against the conclusion
that the existence of a child with disabilities is a "wrong" or an
injury.
Society's recognition of the intrinsic value of human life can be
found in its philosophic and moral thought and its laws and social
policies. Quality-of-life arguments do not stop at birth when un-
dercutting these standards.
'[W]rongful life' implies that an individual should never have existed; and a
child's life, when characterized by severe pain and deprivation, can be an
'injury of continued existence.' On utilitarian grounds, and because of a pos-
itive duty to avoid harm, this argument provides for justifying euthanasia of
small children for the sake of the children themselves.
256
As the late Princeton University ethicist Paul Ramsey noted, it is
impossible to think of a moral argument to justify elective abortion
that cannot, with equal force, justify infanticide.257
Persons with disabilities are also intrinsically worthy, as recog-
nized in "recent legislation concerning employment, education, and
building access . .. [which] evidences a growing public awareness
that the handicapped can be valuable and productive members of
society. To characterize the life of a disabled person as an injury
would denigrate both this new awareness and the handicapped
themselves. '258 One study of twenty-five families with handicapped
255. Although some groups, applying quality-of-life standards, might approve of some
form of infanticide or euthanasia depending on the severity of the child's defect.
256. Reich, supra note 14, at 836.
257. Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding about Abortion, in THE MORALITY OF
ABORTION 79 (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
258. Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 249, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (1986) (citing Comment,
Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 U. CALIF. DAVIS. L. REV. 447, 459-460 (1981)).
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children found that nearly every family concluded the experience
with the disabled child was positive.259 The values inherent in
wrongful birth/life actions are diametrically opposed to traditional
values in the common law. The idea that a child with disabilities
"lead[s] a life that would better never have been lived, or that the
parents are 'damaged' by that child's presence in their family,"
verbalizes a pervasive social prejudice against people with
disabilities.6
0
Recognition of wrongful birth is a "slippery slope" which will
lead to less respect for life in other quarters.
[A] general willingness in society to abort a defective fetus strengthens the
attitude favoring selectivity in accepting or rejecting nascent life. These
fears, expectations, and attitudes of selectivity-which are enhanced by
quality-of-life arguments and which serve as concrete criteria for the utilita-
rian benefit-harm calculus-will encourage and increasingly lead to abortion
for lesser reasons and to infanticide in situations where parents have had no
opportunity for prenatal diagnosis. " '
Wrongful birth plaintiffs do not seek to be restored to their orig-
inal position; thus, such claims are distinct from traditional tort
claims which seek compensation in the usual manner. Historically,
tort and criminal law have attributed a positive value to life. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court has so eloquently stated:
One of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life-whether ex-
perienced with or without a major physical handicap-is more precious than
non-life (citation omitted). Concrete manifestations of this belief are not
difficult to discover. The documents which set forth the principles upon
which our society is founded are replete with references to the sanctity of
life. The federal constitution characterizes life as one of three fundamental
rights of which no man can be deprived without due process of law. U.S.
Const.,Amends. V and XIV. Our own state constitution proclaims that the
'enjoying and defending [of] life' is a natural right. N.J. Const. (1947), Art.
I, 1. The Declaration of Independence states that the primacy of man's
'unalienable' right to life is a 'self-evident truth.' Nowhere in these docu-
ments is there to be found an indication that the lives of persons suffering
from physical handicaps are to be less cherished than those of non-handi-
capped human beings. State legislatures-and thus the people as a
whole-have universally reserved the most severe criminal penalties for in-
dividuals who have unjustifiably deprived others of life. Indeed, so valued is
this commodity that even one who has committed first degree murder can-
not be sentenced to death unless he is accorded special procedural protec-
tions in addition to those given all criminal defendants .... Again, these
259. Koop, supra note 166, at 20.
260. Valentine, supra note 185, at 52.
261. Reich, supra note 14, at 837; see also Koop, supra note 166.
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procedural protections and penalties do not vary according to the presence
or absence of physical deformities in the victim or defendant. It is life itself
that is jealously safeguarded, not life in a perfect state. "2
One who causes a diminution of another's life, through injury,
may be liable for compensation as well as subject to criminal sanc-
tions. The ultimate wrong is to completely end another's life-to
cause his non-existence.2 6 8 "It is basic to the human condition to
seek life and hold on to it however heavily burdened. . . .'For the
living there is hope, but for the dead there is none.' Theocritus."26
Wrongful birth rejects this hierarchy of values and posits the
child's non-existence as the preferred, valued state, thus, a second
distinction: wrongful birth claims apply a different value to life
than traditional claims.
The quality of life rationale, employed to conclude that life with
disabilities may be worse than no life at all, not only creates juris-
prudential line-drawing problems, but also leads to problems of de-
termining "damages." Quality of life criteria inevitably arise from
unusual "hard cases" and are thus inherently unsuited for estab-
lishing or maintaining general standards.
[Q]uality-of-life arguments are invariably put forth as the only 'reasonable'
solution to a hard case created by a given medical prognosis or other set of
medical circumstances. Because such arguments derive their persuasive
force from the uniquely difficult facts of individual cases rather than from
any argument that they are but the logical extension of long-established and
accepted legal principles, a 'case-by-case' approach to decision-making
which accepts the quality-of-life ethic as its starting point will inevitably
have a negative incremental effect on existing law resting on a natural rights
ethic.
2 8
Additionally, "line drawing" based on the economic or social im-
pact of various defects, rather than an absolute value of life, is
complicated by the medical impossibility of determining with cer-
tainty the severity of fetal defects.2 66 To truly determine the "qual-
ity" of the life in question, consideration should also be given to
the life span, available treatment, the potential for medical ad-
262. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 428-29, 404 A.2d 8, 12-13 (1979).
263. Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 46 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 30
N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
264. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
265. Destro, Quality-of-Life Ethics and Constitutional Jurisprudence: The Demise of
Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incompetent, 2 J. CONT. HEALTH
L. & POL'y 71, 90 (1986).
266. Fletcher, supra note 154.
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vances within the child's lifetime, the socio-economic status of the
parents and their ability to cope with the handicap and afford
treatment, and the societal attitude toward the disability and its
treatment, not only at the time of birth, but over the course of the
life being evaluated. Reich states:
[T]he consequentialist ethic relies on the prediction of good and bad results,
and those results depend on contingent factors such as emotional and social
support for the handicapped. Hence this moral theory is vulnerable to arbi-
trary and static assessments. To minimize the problem of arbitrariness, con-
sequentialist theories frequently use operational criteria; but these stan-
dards raise the objection of excessive quantification. For example, use of IQ
scores as a quality-of-life criterion suffers from an excessive and elusive re-
ductionism of human worth; and categorization of moral value of life ac-
cording to syndrome-Down's syndrome, for instance-overlooks the fact
that individuals afflicted with many such defects manifest a wide range of
physical and mental capabilities and handicaps"67
Finally, even a quality of life rationale cannot exist in a vacuum,
but must be based on an underlying determination, or absolute,
which will dispose of cases that fall into a "gray" area or which, by
mistake or lack of technology, slip through initial standards. That
is, should the line be drawn with an ultimate goal to wipe out all
defective lives, at the expense of also catching a number of "qual-
ity" children, or should the line be drawn with a premium on pro-
tecting all healthy children, to the point of allowing some
impairments?
The dilemma lies in deciding what value should be placed on the gains of
terminating affected fetuses and the losses of killing normal fetuses. These
cannot simply be weighted against each other in numerical terms. The value
of terminating affected fetuses must depend on the likely degree of handi-
cap and its effect on parents, their families, and society; some fetuses will be
so severely affected that they will be stillborn or die soon after birth, in
which case amniocentesis and termination cannot be said to have averted
handicap. At the other end of the scale, some will be only mildly affected
and have a prospect of almost normal lives.2 6
8
Speculation involved in measuring damages almost inevitably
leads to the rejection of a wrongful life claim.2"9 The infant plain-
267. Reich, supra note 14, at 836.
268. The Risk of Amniocentesis, LANCET, Dec. 16, 1978, at 1288.
269. E.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H.
231, 248, 513 A.2d 341, 352 (1986); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 252, 178 P.2d 635,
640 (1986); Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547-549 (Ala. 1978); Gildiner v. Thomas Jeffer-
son Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975).
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tiff asks the court to "measure the difference between his life with
defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible
to make such a determination. 2 70 It is not simply the measure of
damage that is precluded, but the determination of whether there
is any damage at all. "Whether it is better never to have been born
at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mys-
tery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theolo-
gians. ''271 One author, after thorough analysis of the court deci-
sions recognizing wrongful life claims, concluded: "None of the
courts granting a wrongful life claim has adequately provided a ra-
tionale for establishing injury. This inability demonstrates clearly
that wrongful life does not fit into traditional negligence
framework.
'2 7 2
Courts have also rejected wrongful birth claims because of the
impossibility of determining if parents are actually damaged by
the addition of a family member with a disability.273 To judge the
worth of a child with disabilities involves the weighing "of the in-
tangible, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits of mother-
hood and fatherhood" against the "benefit" of not having the
child.274 Other courts have found the costs, care and treatment of a
child with disabilities are certain, quantifiable expenses for which
parents may recover.27
270. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
271. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978).
272. Pace, The Treatment of Injury in Wrongful Life Claims, 20 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 145, 166 (1986).
273. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693; Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 313
N.Y.S.2d 502, 503, 504 (1970) ("We note it would be virtually impossible to evaluate as
compensatory damages the anguish to the parents of rearing a malformed child as against
the denial to them of the benefits of parenthood."); Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 424,
386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("When the parents say that the child should
not have been born, they make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in being
the mother and father of a defective child."). See also Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103,
112, 337 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1985)(rejecting wrongful birth claim, noting that courts which
have recognized the claim have failed to establish any concensus as to the measure of dam-
ages, which types of damages should be allowed, whether such damages should be offset by
"emotional or other benefits accruing to the parents by reason of the life, love and affection
of the defective child," and which, if any, steps should be required of the parents to mitigate
damages, such as putting the child up for adoption).
274. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693; 53 A.D.2d at 424, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
275. E.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 482, 656 P.2d 483, 496
(1983) ("General damages are certainly beyond computation . . . [and] therefore incapable
of satisfying the requirement . . . that damages be established with 'reasonable certainty.'
• . . But" 'extraordinary expenses for medical care and special training ... are calculable"
and hence recoverable); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849, 850 (Tex. 1975) (court
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The jurisprudential questions abound. Is the value of human life
measured simply in economic terms, or should expenses be offset
by the more abstract advantages of a unique life in the family?
The logical flaw of measuring the value of life by actual, ascertain-
able expenses is that it begs the question of whether there is really
injury, or net damage, to the claimant. For example, a person with
no mode of transportation, when presented with the gift of a Mer-
cedes, might claim "damages" of the costs of fuel and mainte-
nance, as well as emotional distress of learning to drive and park,
and of worrying about accidents, theft, insurance, speeding tickets,
highway patrolmen, and all the responsibilities of owning an auto-
mobile. The automobile may even be defective as compared to
other automobiles-it may require considerable repair, perhaps
even fairly constant "treatment." It may never run as quickly,
smoothly, efficiently, or as comfortably as other autos. Still, has
the plaintiff been damaged by the gift? The determination involves
a comparison to the original, auto-less state, not to the costs or
qualities of other automobiles. Thus, the court decisions recogniz-
ing wrongful birth, cited above, 76 which measure damages by com-
paring expenses with those attributable to rearing a normal child,
have not resolved the issue of whether damage has occurred. The
first question, before measurement becomes an issue, is whether
the plaintiff has been harmed.
Secondly, a careful perusal of these court opinions277 reveals that
the issue of offsetting benefits from the life of the child was not
addressed, save for the Berman court, which held the benefits of
objected to parents claim for damages for all expenses incurred in raising child and for
mental or emotional anguish, as based upon "speculation as to the quality of life and as to
the pluses and minuses of parental mind and emotion," but allowed recovery for the "eco-
nomic burden [due] solely to the physical defects of the child," expenses reasonably neces-
sary for the care and treatment of physical impairment); 46 N.Y.2d at 412-13, 386, N.E.2d
at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (allowing recovery for ascertainable pecuniary expenses but not
for psychic or emotional harm alleged to result from birth of impaired child); 69 Wis. 2d at
776, 233 N.W.2d at 377 (allows recovery for necessary expenses greater than costs occa-
sioned by normal child, which can be established with reasonable medical certainty); 128
N.H. at 244-47, 513 A.2d at 349-51 (damages for emotional distress not recoverable but
tangible pecuniary losses beyond ordinary child-raising costs allowed); Berman v. Allan, 80
N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (1979) (expenses for treatment and care of child disallowed
because parents "retain all the benefits inhering in the birth of the child-i.e., the love and
joy they will experience as parents," but recognizing claim for mental and emotional anguish
suffered as a result of child's condition). Cf. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 82, 439 A.2d 110,






parenthood precluded recovery for related expenses, and that an
award of medical and child raising expenses would not only be
"disproportionate to the culpability involved," but would "consti-
tute a windfall to the parents. 278
As to the birth of a healthy child, most courts rule that child
rearing costs are not recoverable, often after applying the "offset"
rule to find the "intangible and incalculable benefits. . . are always
greater than the costs of rearing the child. '2 79 Often the specula-
tive, incalculable nature of child rearing costs themselves has been
cited as a rationale for denying recovery.280 Courts which fail to
extend the "offset" rule to situations involving children with disa-
bilities not only make a fundamental judgment as to the value of
varying "qualities" of life, but also implicitly rule that the law re-
gards the life of a healthy child differently than that of a physi-
cally or mentally impaired child.2 8
While the emotional stress associated with the birth of a child
with disabilities may be greater than that of a nondisabled child,
can it be said with certainty that such stress will outweigh the
emotional benefits of rearing the child-the parental joy felt when
a physically or mentally impaired youngster achieves new tri-
umphs; and the patience, love, and bonding formed when working
together through adversity? In this regard, the potential for emo-
tional and spiritual benefits may be greater when raising a child
with disabilities. "These intangible benefits, while impossible to
value in dollars and cents, are undoubtedly the things that make
life worthwhile. Who can place a price tag on a child's smile or the
parental pride in a child's achievement? 2 82 Or can it be said with
certainty that the emotional and physical stress resulting from the
birth of a disabled child will not be outweighed by the considerable
long-term emotional and physical effects of the alternative, an
abortion?
23
278. 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
279. Note, Wrongful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of
Damages, 53 FORDHAM L. Rav. 1107, 1112 nn.32-33 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Avoidance
of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages]; see also supra note 20.
280. Note, The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigaiton of Damages, supra
note 279, at 1110; Scheid, Benefits vs. Burdens: The Limitation of Damages in Wrongful
Birth, 23 J. FAM. L. 57, 93 (1984-85) [hereinafter Scheid].
281. See Capron, supra note 26, at 636.
282. Terrel v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974).
283. See Blumberg, Golbus, & Hanson, The Psychological Sequelae of Abortion Per-
formed for a Genetic Indication, 122 Am. J. OasTET. GYNECOL. 799 (1975); Barrett, Boehm, &
Killam, Induced Abortion: A Risk Factor for Placenta Previa, 141 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL.
Vol. 27:461
Birth Related Torts
Finally, as to pecuniary costs of child-rearing, it should be rele-
vant when calculating offset that the parents initially desired or
planned to have a child and were prepared to incur some degree of
expenses, which should be deducted from the "costs" of the
"wrongful" birth.2 84 This does not mean that the benefits of a
hoped-for normal child should be subtracted from the value of the
child with disabilities because the comparison is not to a healthy
child, but to the alternative of abortion.
The "benefit" rule of section 920 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the inter-
est of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable2 86
There is some controversy as to whether the "same interest" lan-
guage of this rule, as explained in comment B to section 920, would
limit offsets of pecuniary costs to pecuniary benefits and offsets of
emotional harm to emotional benefits. Courts have nearly unani-
mously rejected this narrow interpretation. The interest of the
plaintiff can be seen broadly as a child-rearing or familial inter-
est.2 86 The Restatement seems to reflect the long-standing tort
principle of damnum absque injuria-if the defendant's negligence
fortuitously produces a good, then no cause of action arises. 287
May society determine that life is intrisically more valuable than
its absence, as a matter of fundamental social value and policy?
For example, one such policy is based on the "emotional bastard"
theory: that to allow parents to publicly proclaim, via a legal claim,
that their child's life is an injury to them, it will have undesirable
social effects, particularly on such children.28 8 "This inquiry into
the parent's perception of the value of the unwanted child may
adversely affect the child's attitudes of self-worth and esteem. 2 89
"We do not believe that the law should provide a basis for . . .
interfamilial warfare. It is obvious that the application of a 'wrong-
769 (1981); New York State Department of Health Office of Biostatistics, Effect of Induced
Abortion on Subsequent Reproductive Function (1980).
284. Capron, supra note 26, at 638, 639 n.91; Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103,
119-20, 337 S.E.2d 528, 539 (1985) (Exum, J., dissenting).
285. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965).
286. See Capron, supra note 25, at 638, 639 n.91.
287. Scheid, supra note 280, at 98.
288. See Note, The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages,
supra note 279, at 1111.
289. Scheid, supra note 280, at 98.
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ful life' doctrine would corrode family life. '290 The rationale be-
hind this argument suggests a policy interest of larger scope-not
merely prevention of psychological stigma to the child and harm to
the family, but prevention of social prejudice against people with
disabilities in general.
May a court determine as a matter of law that there is no net
damage created by a birth, no matter how great the concrete eco-
nomic costs? For example, the Illinois Supreme Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Ward, held that the benefits of having a healthy
child far outweighed the costs, not based on any "benefits rule,"
but as a matter of public policy. "[T]he court pointed out that the
parents would be placed in the unseemly position of proving in
open court that their own child was a detriment. . . . [T]he court
believed this would be destructive to the health of the child in par-
ticular and the family in general. '291 Should the life be valued by
quality standards which rate disabilities by their objective value,
or lack thereof, to society? Reich states:
When the overall quality of life or categorical condition of life is the stan-
dard for the moral judgment on value of life, this relative criterion is at
odds with the concept of the moral equality of all human beings and the
fundamental principles of justice which undergird the ethical and legal pro-
tection of life in Western society.2 2
B. Decisions: Who Holds The Scales?
Should the evaluation be made by juries, left to the mythical
"reasonable person," or should parents decide the ultimate value
of life? Within the limits of the trimester formula, Roe v. Wade
removed the power of the state to ascribe absolute value to an un-
born child and passed the determination to the mother, as part of
the abortion "choice. '293 Thus, it is possible to find, in one room of
a hospital, surgeons battling heroically, using the best, most capital
intensive, modern technology, to save the life of a baby born at the
twenty-first week of gestation, while in the next room a surgeon
quietly aborts a twenty-three-week-old fetus. This shifting of the
value of life from objective standards to subjective decision-making
assumes greater proportions in the wrongful birth claim. Consider
these hypotheticals:
290. Comment, An Action for "Wrongful Life," 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1078, 1080 (1963).
291. Scheid, supra note 280, at 94.
292. Reich, supra note 14, at 836.
293. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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(1) Mrs. Doe has given birth to a child with disabilities and is on the way to
see an attorney to file a wrongful birth claim. She plans to tell the jury that
the life of her child causes her emotional distress as well as financial loss. A
negligent driver strikes Mrs. Doe's automobile and kills the child. The at-
torney will now file a wrongful death claim, alleging that the negligent
driver has deprived Mrs. Doe of the love, companionship, affection, pa-
tience, and joy the child brought to the mother.
(2) Mrs. Doe has learned that the child she is carrying suffers from disabili-
ties. Dr. Luke provided this diagnosis too late for an abortion. Mrs. Doe has
seen her attorney and has prepared a wrongful birth complaint to file as
soon as the child is born. During delivery, Dr. Luke is negligent, resulting in
the death of the baby. Instead of wrongful birth, Mrs. Doe sues Dr. Luke for
wrongful death.
In these hypotheticals, Mrs. Doe is not necessarily advancing
fraudulent claims. All that is required is an actual change in her
subjective emotional state. Under the pressures of raising a child
with disabilities, she may truly believe she has been injured, and
might convince a jury that a reasonable person in her situation
would have aborted the child given the requisite prenatal counsel-
ing. Upon losing a baby, she faces a different reality, and may "re-
alize" the absence of her child is a real loss, with real emotional
consequences. She may genuinely feel deprived of something of
great value ("no matter what his condition, he was my baby") and
may convince a jury of her injury.
Of course, these hypotheticals do demonstrate the potential for
fraudulent claims. Wrongful birth "is a cause based on an after-
the-event contingency which plaintiffs make operable by the oper-
ations of their minds."2 94 Some courts have cited this potential as a
policy reason for denying such claims.
[Tihe tort of wrongful birth will be peculiarly subject to fraudulent claims.
The wrongful birth claim will almost always hinge upon testimony given by
.the parents after the birth concerning their desire prior to the birth to ter-
minate the fetus should it be defective. The temptation will be great for
parents, if not to invent such a prior desire to abort, to at least deny the
possibility that they might have changed their minds and allowed the child
to be born even if they had known of the defects it would suffer.2 95
Similarly, a New York court rejected the parent's claim, noting
"allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on
physicians and obstetricians. It would either open the way for
294. Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 425, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463 (N.Y. App. Div.
1976).
295. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 113, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (1985) (citing Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974)).
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fraudulent claims or enter a field that has no sensible or just stop-
ping point."29
These examples illustrate major distinctions between traditional
torts and the wrongful birth claim. First, the claim is inconsistent
with the value of life implicit in the judicial or statutory recogni-
tion of the wrongful death claim, in which "[tihe presence of the
child is being viewed in absolute terms as an overwhelming
good." '297 More significantly, and more subtly, the traditional fun-
damental value of life may be determined, for purposes of attach-
ing liability to the conduct of others, not by objective standards,
but by the subjective value the mother chooses to assign to her
child's life.
III. CONCLUSION
Wrongful birth and wrongful life causes of action must be distin-
guished from wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy causes
of action. In essence, wrongful conception/pregnancy actions fall
within traditional common law torts relating to medical malprac-
tice or negligence. They require no new legal theories. However,
wrongful birth/life claims do require a new legal theory, in that life
itself is considered a wrong, and death is preferred over life with
disabilities. By deviating from the general principle, historically
found in civilized law, that life, even with disabilities, is valuable
and that only wrongful death is compensable, wrongful birth/life
actions are a radical departure from fundamental legal philosophy.
Courts that have recognized wrongful birth/life actions have typ-
ically cited Roe v. Wade as the basis for this right of recovery.
However, a Hohfeldian analysis demonstrates that the two "rights"
involved are distinctly different types of legal relationships, such
that the policy justifications and interest balancing of Roe do not
compel the leap to the right to recover for wrongful birth/life.
Moreover, the holding of Roe is sharply limited by its context-a
consideration of a state criminal statute.
A utilitarian analysis of the competing interests involved in
wrongful birth/life claims yields markedly different policy conclu-
sions than those derived from an application of the utilitarian
model to Roe. Wrongful birth/life liability results in financial pres-
sure on physicians to employ defensive medicine and to advise pre-
natal screening and abortion. The social and medical pressures on
296. 53 A.D.2d at 425, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 463-63.
297. Scheid, supra note 280, at 95.
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potential mothers to screen and abort creates the ethical problem
of the over-kill of normal, healthy children.
In the wake of wrongful birth liability, the increased abortion of
healthy and desired unborn children not only skews the parental
right of reproductive choice, but also conflicts with the state inter-
est in potential life. The interests of those leading lives with disa-
bilities-to be treated with respect and not prejudice, and to be
regarded as valued citizens instead of social evils-are undermined
by a cause of action that proclaims a life with disabilities as a dam-
age to one's self or others. The interests of medicine and society, in
independent medical judgment and rights of conscience, are also
violated by the intrusions attendant to wrongful birth/life liability.
Thus, a jurisprudential analysis demonstrates that, even if the
"rights" and "interests" balanced in Roe are accepted for the sake
of argument, Roe does not justify wrongful birth/life causes of
action.
Judicial recognition of wrongful birth/life claims often springs
from an understandable sympathy for a difficult, but rare situa-
tion: parents who desired a healthy, robust youngster have instead
given birth to a child with severe disabilities. But "hard facts make
bad law." These rare cases should be solved with greater effort,
both public and private, to help bear the costs of rearing the chil-
dren with disabilities. If, for the sake of a few extreme situations,
general values are shifted from the presumed intrinsic worth of
life, upon which so much of the criminal and civil law is founded,
the hard exceptions swallow the rule. The presumption favoring
life is shifted to a snowballing policy that snuffs out normal un-
born children in an effort to eradicate persons with disabilities. It
is this implicit inescapable prejudice against individuals with disa-
bilities in particular, and the unborn in general, that pervades the
wrongful birth/life rationale. Neither this categorical prejudgment
of the worth of others, nor an arbitrary subjective "choice" which
determines whether human life is a blessing or a liability, should
be clothed with the dignity of law through the recognition of
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.
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